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C HAP T E R 18 
Constitutional Law 
JOHN D. O'REILLY, JR. 
§18.1. The eligibility of political candidates to be listed on state 
election ballots. The provisions of the Massachusetts election laws1 
governing the eligibility of independent candidates and of candidates of 
"minority parties" to be listed on election ballots was reviewed in Baird 
v. Davoren2 by a three-judge federal district court. Chapter 53 of the 
General Laws provides three methods of placing a candidate's name on 
the ballot: (1) a party whose candidate received at least three per cent 
of the votes cast for governor at the last election may nominate a candi-
date;3 (2) a party whose candidates in the three preceding elections 
received at least one-tenth of one percent of the votes cast for governor 
in such elections may nominate a candidate;4 or (3) a candidate's name 
may be placed on the ballot if it i,s supported by nomination papers 
signed by qualified voters equal in number to at least three percent of 
the number of total votes cast for governor at the last election, provided 
that no more than one-third of such signatures come from the same 
county.s The first method assur.es the "Inajor" parties places on the 
ballot; the third method makes it possible for a non-partisan candidate 
to run for office. The second method, as its legislative history shows, 
w$ designed to save "minority" parties from extinction, which was im-
mi'nent when the election laws were revised in 1939. The first method 
is, of course, the usual method for placing the names of partisan candi-
dates on the ballot.6 
The Baird case was instituted as an action for declaratory relief by 
various plaintiffs including Baird, an independent candidate running for 
the U.S. Senate, and various individuals running for state and federal 
JOHN D. O'REILLY, JR. is Professor of Law at Boston College Law School and 
a member of the Bars of Massachusetts, the District of Columbia, and the Supreme 
Court of the United States. 
§18.1. 1 G.L., c. 53, Ul, 6. 
2 346 F. Supp. 515 (D. Mass. 1972). 
3 G.L., c. 53, § 1. 
4Id. 
SId. §6. 
6 Acts of 1939, c. 191, which amended G.L., c. 53, was believed by the 
governor to endanger the existence of minority parties. After an executive message 
explaining this fear, the legislature enacted Acts of 1939, c. 371, which amended 
G.L., c. 53, § 1 by inserting the second method of obtaining a place on the ballot. 
346 F. Supp. 515, 518 (D. Mass. 1972). 
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office under the banner of the Socialist Workers Party. The plaintiffs 
attacked the ballot-access provisions of Chapter 53 with several con-
stitutional claims. Under the three alternative provisions, an "indepen-
dent" candidate must demonstrate much broader support than a minority 
party candidate to get on the ballot. The court, in an opinion which 
thoroughly canvassed the recent Supreme Court decisions in election 
cases, concluded that such a preference for minority party candidates 
over independent candidates deprived the independent candidates of 
the equal protection of the law since it was not "reasonable" to regulate 
the election process by preserving a status quo.' 
Since the preference for minority party candidates was held to deny 
equal protection, the court could have invalidated either the "one-tenth 
of one percent" provision for minority party candidates, or the "three 
percent" provision for independent candidates. The court chose to in-
validate the former, thus requiring both minority party and independent 
candidates to conform to a three percent requirement and affording 
equal protection to both.8 
Proceeding to the section that allows nomination by signatures of 
registered voters,9 the court concluded that the provision which disquali-
fies signatures in anyone county in excess of one-third of the total 
constituted an impermissible dilution of the voting power of registered 
voters in elections for state-wide office. The Constitution requires equal 
weight to be accorded to the will of each voter in the election unit.10 
Such a qualification of the right to obtain nomination by signatures was 
therefore unconstitutional.11 
Nevertheless, the court declined to accept the plaintiffs' contention 
that discrimination was also present in the pattern under which new 
parties and independents must obtain nominating signatures, while mdjor 
parties may be represented on the basis of their candidates' records in 
preceding elections. Such a difference in treatment is constitutionally 
permissible. Since the state has a legitimate interest in preventing misuse 
of the election process it may justifiably require some demonstration of 
support before allowing a candidate's nrone to appear on the ballot.12 
In the case of major parties, such support would be plainly demonstrated 
by the history of past elections. 
Finally, the court ruled that the invalidated provisions of Chapter 53 
were severable and that their invalidity did not bring down the whole 
electoral process.13 In a petition for rehearing the Socialist Workers 
Party contended that, as a party it was not allowed under Section 6 to 
7 346 F. Supp. 515, 520-21 (D. Mass. 1972), citing Jenness v. Fortson, 403 
U.S. 431 (1971), and Wi1l'iams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968). 
8 346 F. Supp. 515,521 (D. Mass. 1972). 
9 G.L., c. 53, §6. 
10 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
11 346 F. Supp. 515, 522 (D. Mass. 1972). 
12 Id. at 521-22. :' 
13 Id. at 522-23. 
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gain ballot access by filing nomination papers, since that section is im-
plicitly reseIVed for independent candidates.14 Since the party was not 
in a position to nominate candidates by primary election or party con-
vention they argued that it would be unconstitutionally driven out of 
existence. However, the court chose to abstain on that issue; since it was 
not entirely clear that the statute would prevent the party from selecting 
a candidate by filing nomination papers, the issue was more appropriate 
for resolution in state courts.1$ 
§18.2. Criminal law: Constitutionality of flag desecration and 
motorcycle helmet statutes. The 1972 SURVEY year witnessed a direct 
conflict between the state and federal courts over the validity of a 
criminal statute prohibiting the contemptuous treatment of the flag of 
the United States.1 In Commonwealth v. Goguen,2 a rescript opinion, 
the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the conviction of a defendant who 
wore in public an American flag sewn to the seat of his trousers. The 
Court rejected the defendant's contention that his conduct was constitu-
tionally protected "symbolic speech."3 It also ruled that Street v. New 
York4 and Cohen v. California5 were not controlling, since it was clear 
that the defendant was not prosecuted for anything he had said, or for 
any vulgarity of expression. 
Upon his imprisonment, the defendant brought a petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus, which was granted by the federal district court.6 That 
court ruled that one's use of the flag may constitute symbolic expression, 
and that "[ o]nly as necessary to further a substantial or important govern-
1+ G.L., c. 53, 16 merely 'states that "[nlominations of candidates for any 
offices to be filled at a state election may be made by nomination papers. . • ." 
Apparently the Socialist Workers Party was arguing that it was precluded from 
using this method because ballot access for parties is completely provided in 
Section 1. 
1$ 346 F. Supp. 515, 524-526 (D. Mass. 1972). 
§ 18.2. 1 G.L., c. 264, 15: "Whoever publicly bums or otherwise mutil'a:tes, 
tramples upon, defaces or treats contemptuously the flag of the United States or 
of Massachusetts . . . shall be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred 
dollars or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or both." 
2 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 303, 279 N.E.2d 666. 
3 "His communication, if any, was so thoroughly inarticulate as to lack the 
slightest redeeming social importance." Id. at 303, 279 N.E.2d at 667, citing Roth 
v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). The relevance of the Court's citation 
to Roth is obscure, since the "redeeming social' importance" test set forth in that 
case was created in the context of the state's right to control obscene literature. 
+ 394 U.S. 576 (1969). Although in this case ,the petitioner attacked the validity 
of a flag-burning statute, the Court overturned his conviction on the ground that 
the jury might have convicted him for what he had said, rather than for what 
he had done. 
$' 403 U.S. 15 (1971). In this case petitioner's conviction for breaching the 
peace was overturned, since the conviction resulted merely from his wearing a 
jacket on which was ,ewn an obscene reference to the draft. 
6 Goguen v. Smith, '343 F. Supp. 161 (D. Mass. 1972), aff'd 471 F.2d 88 (1st 
Cir.1972). 
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mental interest may the state curtail symbolic expression."7 The court 
also indicated that a flag-respect statute can easily be overboard unless 
it is so narrowly drawn as to prohibit only breaches of the peace or to 
protect the flag itself from physical damage. In any event, the terms of 
the statute were held to be unconstitutionally vague for failure to define 
the sort of treatment which constitutes unlawful contempt of the flag.8 
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed on the basis of that 
holding.9 
In another case a three-judge district court rejected a challenged 
exercise of the Commonwealth's police power. In Simon li. Sargent,lO 
an action for declaratory judgment, the court sustained per curiam the 
v:alidity of a statute that requires riders of motorcycles to wear pro-
tective helmets.ll A similar result had been reached four years earlier 
by the Supreme Judicial Court in a case for which the Supreme Court 
of the United States denied review.12 In the Simon case, the court 
brushed aside the contention that the state has no power to protect a 
cyclist from the consequences of his imprudence. It pointed out that 
injuries to a cyclist may have impacts upon society as a whole in the 
form of imposing burdens upon public health services, the unemployment 
insurance structure, and the public welfare assistance system.13 The failure 
of the statute to require operators of automobiles to wear protective 
helmets did not present an equal protection deficiency since automobiles 
offer drivers substantially more structural protection against injury than 
do motorcycles. 
§18.3. Constitutional privilege to protect information sources: Re-
cent developments. A year ago there was. noted in these pages' the 
pendency of litigation over the issue of whether the First Amendment 
confers upon news gatherers a privilege not to disclose to grand juries 
information received in confidence. 1 In In re Pappas2 the Supreme Judi-
7 343 F. Supp. 161, 165 (D. Mass. 1972), citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 
U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968). 
8 343 F. Supp. 161, 167-68 (D. Mass. 1972). 
9 471 F.2d 88 (1st Cir. 1972). 
10 346 F. Supp. 277 (D. Mass. 1972). 
11 G.L., c. 90, §7, as amended by Acts of 1967, c. 13. 
12 Comm. v. Howie, 354 Mass. 769, ,238 N.E.2d 373 ceTt. den. 393 U.S. 999 
(1968). 
13 However, the court explicitly declined to base its ruling on "the state's 
generalized assertion of an interest in the continued productivity of its citizenry." 
346 F. Supp. 277, 279 (D. Mass. 1972). 
§l8.3. 1 1971 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §16.8. 
2 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 69, 266 N.E.2d 297. In this case the petitioner, a tele-
vision newsman-photographer, had been allowed access, during a civil disturbance, 
to the headquarters of the Bl'ack Panther Party in New Bedford, Mass., on the 
condition that he" would not reveal anything he saw or heard while inside unless 
there was a police raid. No public reports concerning his presence were ever made 
by the petitioner. When summoned to testify before a grand jury investigating 
the New Bedford disturbances, petitioner brought a motion to quash the sum-
4
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cial Court of Massachusetts held that there w.as no such privilege; the 
Kentucky Court of Appeals ruled similarly in Branzburg v. Pound.3 
However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
reversed a reporter's conviction for contempt in Caldwell v. United 
State/< and held that the reporter could not be required to testify before 
a grand jury as to confidential interviews with members of the Black 
Panther Party. The United States Supreme Court granted review in all 
three cases.5 
On June 29, 1972 the Supreme Court announced its decision, affinning 
Branzburg and Pappas, and reversing Caldwell.6 With four justices dis-
senting, the Court held that the First Amendment did not carve out any 
exception for newsmen to the common obligation of all citizens to 
answer relevant questions put to them by a grand jury during the course 
of an investigation into criminal activity.7 The dissenters argued that 
mandatory disclosure of information gained in confidence would inhibit 
the future flow of information from sources w.ho are reluctant to have 
their identity or some of their information known. This would frustrate 
the public's right to be informed through the media, a right which the 
dissenters perceived to be protected by the First Amendment.s 
The majority and the dissenters alike recognized the danger that the 
grand jury process might be subverted if grand jury investigations were 
used as tools of political or social harassment.9 The majority pointed out 
mons, claiming a constitutional privilege not to disclose the information received 
in confidence. The Supreme Judicial Court upheld the trial court's denial of the 
motion. 
3 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 1970). In this case the petitioner had wriotten a news-
paper article detailing the activities of two unnamed drug dealers in Jefferson 
County, Kentucky. Upon his refusal to identify the dealers to a grand jury, a 
trial court judge ordered him to do so, rejecting his claim of constitutional 
privil'ege. Petitioner sought to reverse this order by petitioning for a writ of 
prohibition and mandamus in the Kentucky Court of Appeals. His claim to a 
constitutional privilege was again rejeoted, and the petition was denied. 
+ 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970). In this case the petitioner, a newspaper 
reporter, was subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury concerning the sources 
of information for several newspaper articles he had written on the Black Panther 
Party. Upon his refusal to appear, he was hel'cl in contempt by a federal district 
court. The court· of appeals reversed, holding that, unless the government could 
make a special showing of necessity, the First Amendment protected petitioner 
from compelled disclosure of news sources. 
5 402 U.S. 942 (1971). 
6 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). The change in caption was made 
because Judge Pound, against whom the original petition for prohibition and 
mandamus had been brought, was succeeded in office by Judge Hayes. 
7 Id. at 679-91. 
SId. at 720-25 (Douglas J., dissenting). 
9 It has become fashionable to characterize the invocation of the whole criminal 
process in some instances as political persecution, rather than the proper enforce-
ment of the criminal law. This has been particularly true when official action is 
directed at members of various sub-cultures. Thus two of the three cases before 
the Supreme Court in Branzburg arose from investigations of the Black Panther 
5
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that harassment had not been shown in the instant cases, and that, in 
any event, private rights would be adequately protected by the presiding 
judge who exercises supervisory control over the grand jury proceeding.lO 
The dissenters, however, argued that the transition from use to abuse 
of the grand jury investigatory power is so subtle and difficult to establish 
that the only effective way to assure the free flow of information is to 
prevent involuntary disclosure of confidential communications.11 
Meanwhile, the obligation of witnesses to give testimony to grand 
juries continues to be litigated on other fronts. Several such cases arose 
from grand jury investigations into the publication of the so-called 
"Pentagon Papers." These papers were originally contained in the secret 
files of the Department of Defense. They consisted of agency reports 
and other documents, many of which criticized the establishment and 
maintenance of the recent United States military presence in Southeast 
Asia. Unauthorized persons made xerox copies of the papers and gave 
them wide distribution.12 Subsequently, United States Senator Mike 
Gravel obtained a copy of the papers, and introduced them into the 
proceedings of the Senate Subcommittee on Public Buildings and 
Grounds of which he was Chairman. Senator Gravel then made ar-
rangements with a private publisher for commercial publication of all 
the papers. 
A federal grand jury in the District of Massachusetts, convened to 
investigate the release and publication of the Pentagon Papers, summoned 
many witnesses who objected to testifying on various grounds of con-
stitutional privilege. Two such witnesses were Leonard S. Rodberg, an 
aide to Senator Gravel, and Howard Webber, the publisher with whom 
the Senator had consulted. Both witnesses brought motions to quash 
their subpoenas, and Senator Gravel intervened. The Senator and the 
two witnesses argued that an order compelling the witnesses to testify 
would violate the Speech or Debate Clause of the United States Consti-
tution.13 Rodberg argued that this clause extends a constitutional privilege 
Party, while the third arose from an investigation of marijuana users and dis-
tributors. 
10 Id. at 699-708. 
11 Id. at 719-21. 
12 The publication of some of the Pentagon Papers in various metropolitan 
newspapers gave rise to the celebrated and novel case of New York Times v. 
United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). This case was the result of the federal 
government's efforts to enjoin the continued publication of the papers by the 
New York Times and the Washington Post during the summer of 1971. The 
Court, in a per curiam opinion with substantial concurring and dissenting opin-
ions, upheld the denial of the injunctions by the district courts involved. The 
Court concluded that the government had not met its "'heavy burden of show-
ing justification for the imposition of such a [prior] restraint [on expression].''' 
Id. at 714, citing Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 
(1971). 
13 U.S. Const., Art. I, §6, cl. 1 provides in part that "for any Speech or 
Debate in either House, . . . [Senators and Representatives] shall not be ques-
tioned in any other Place." 
6
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1972 [1972], Art. 21
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1972/iss1/21
§18.3 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 461 
to the preparation of any speeches or debate material, including the 
source of any documents used therein. Webber, on the other hand, 
argued that the clause extends a constitutional privilege to arrangements 
for a republication of any speeches or debate material. 
The federal district court denied both motions to quash, but issued 
a protective order forbidding any inquiry of Rodberg regarding his or 
the Senator's conduct at the Subcommittee hearing in preparation for 
the meeting. I4 On the appeal of both Senator Gravel and the govern-
ment, the circuit court affirmed.15 The court held that the Senator's 
activities in preparation for a speech or debate were protected, and that 
such protection extended to the sowrces of material used in preparation.16 
Such protection extended not only to the Senator, but also to any aides 
involved in the preparationP However, the privilege was not extended 
to Webber and the district court's refusal to include Webber within 
the protective order was affirmed.18 
Petitions for certiorari filed by both Senator Gravel and the govern-
ment were allowed by the Supreme Court.19 On review, the Court held 
that the Speech or Debate Clause covers any act of a Senator's aide 
which, if done by the Senator personally, would be a "legislative act."20 
Applying this standard, the Supreme Court agreed with the circuit court 
that arrangements for private publication of the Pentagon Papers were 
not protected,21 but that preparation for a speech or debate was pro-
tected. However, the Court held that neither the Senator nor his aides 
had a privilege not to disclose his sources of the Pentagon Papers "as 
long as no legislative act is implicated by the questions."22 
The Pentagon Papers grand jury also summoned two other witnesses 
who were members of the academic community. Each resisted subpoenas 
to testify as to the identity of persons known by them to have had in-
formation about the taking, duplication and distribution of the papers, 
on the ground that any information they had was received in confidence, 
and that a breach of that confidence would have a chilling effect on 
their sources and thus handicap their scholarly research and publication. 
The federal district court denied a motion to quash a subpoena directed 
14 United States v. John Doe, 332 F. Supp. 930 (D. Mass. 1971). 
15 United States v. John Doe, 455 F.2d 753 (1st Gir. 1972). 
16 "It seems manifest that allowing a grand jury to question a senator about 
his sources would chill both the vigor with which legislators seek facts, and the 
wil1ingness of potential sources to supply them." Id. at 758-59, citing Caldwell 
v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970). The Caldwell case was over-
ruled by the Supreme Court in the Branzburg case; see discussion supra. 
17 United States v. John Doe, 455 F.2d 753, 761 (1st Cir. 1972). 
18 Id. at 761-62. 
19 Gravel v. United States, 405 U.S. 916 (1972). 
20 Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 616-22 (1972). 
21 Id. at 622-27. 
22 Id. at 628. The Court apparently did not feel compelled to define "legisla-
tive act;" nor did it attempt to explain the distinction between "obtaining docu-
ments" for a speech or debate and "preparing" for a speech or debate. 
7
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to one of the academicians because it found as a fact that the claim of 
impairment of research potential had not been substantiated.23 The other 
witness, however, was convicted of contempt for failure to answer the 
grand jury's questions. The circuit court affirmed on the broad ground 
that the scholar's privilege is not recognized by the law.24 The witness 
was imprisoned, and was released only when the term of the grand jury 
expired. 
The last word in the general controversy over a privilege to protect 
information sources has probably not yet been spoken. The news media 
have presented a united and highly vociferous front, deploring the judi-
cial rejections of a constitutional privilegep and urging the establishment 
of a privilege through legislation. However, there has not been complete 
agreement even within the media as to the terms which a privilege 
statute should contain. Questions yet to be resolved include: (1) whether 
the privilege should be absolute or qualified; (2) whether it should extend 
to all information acquired in confidence or only to limited categories 
of data; and (3) whether it should extend to professional reporters only, 
or also to occasional commentators and academicians.26 
§18.4. Criminal procedure: Prosecutorial duty to disclose exculpa-
tory information: Harmless error doctrine: Immunity statutes. 1 Com-
monwealth v. Thompson2 presented a question regarding the extent of 
a prosecutor's pretrial obligation to disclose information that may tend 
to exculpate the defendant.3 The defendant was convicted of three as-
saults allegedly committed in a restaurant. He later obtained two affi~ 
davits from the night manager of the restaurant where the assault had 
occurred. The first affidavit declared that the manager had seen a person 
other than the defendant enter the restaurant alone prior to the assault, 
that he recognized this person as a known troublemaker, and that he 
therefore went into another room in the restaurant to call the police. 
23 United States v. John Doe, 332 F. Supp. 938 (D. Mass. 1971). 
24 United States v. John Doe, 460 F.2d 329 (1st Cir. 1972). 
25 A group called The Reporters' Committee for Freedom of the Press has 
compil'eci a list of thirty instances in which reporters, publishers, and broad-
casters have been threatened with or incurred legal sanctions for refusing to 
give information sought in connection with law enforcement activities. N.Y. Times, 
Feb. IS, 1973, at 75, col. 1. 
26 Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 1970), discussed supra, is illustra-
tive of the difficulties involved in drafting privilege statutes. Ky. Rev. Stat. §421.100 
provides that newsmen are privileged to withhold the sources of information ob-
tained in preparing a story for publication or broadcast. The state court con-
strued this statute as releasing newsmen only from the obligation to reveal the 
identity of persons who made statements, and not from the obligation to testify 
as to what the report had seen at marijuana rituals to which he had been 
invited in confidence. See also In re Bridge, 295 A.2d 3 (N.]. 1972). 
§lS.4. 1 See also §§1.l-1.7, and §§7.1-7.5, supra. 
2 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1503, 286 N.E.2d 333. 
3 As enunciated in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), this duty to 
disclose stems from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
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Upon hearing a noise, he returned to the public area of the restaurant 
and saw the assault victim being held by a stranger. He ordered the 
stranger and his accomplice to leave. Later he observed the defendant 
through a window at the police station, and stated that the defendant 
was not in the restaurant at the time of the assault. The second affidavit 
explained in more detail the manager's belief that the defendant was not 
the assailant. On the basis of these two affidavits, the defendant made a 
motion for a new trial. Defendant argued that the failure to disclose the 
manager's inability to identify the defendant amounted to an unconstitu-
tional suppression of evidence favorable to the defendant. The trial court 
denied the motion, and the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed. As to the 
first affidavit, the Court observed that "[i]t could have been found . . . 
that the affiant was absent during the assault. That being so, such evi-
dence could hardly be favorable to the accused and material to the issue 
of guilt."4 Regarding the second affidavit, the Court held that although 
it contained "evidence very favorable to the defendant which ... might 
indeed be material to the issue of guilt," the passage of time between 
the commission of the crime and the taking of that affidavit justified 
the trial judge's disbelief of its content.5 
The Thompson case is representative of the difficulty of implementing 
the legal ideals that have evolved to protect the right of criminal de-
fendants to a fair trial. The prosecutorial duty to disclose information 
developed from a simple obligation to refrain from knowingly using false 
or perjured testimony,6 to the affirmative obligation to disclose exculpa-
tory material, as enunciated in Alcorta v. Texas1 and Brady v. Maryland.8 
In actual practice, however, the scope of this duty to disclose is far from 
clear. For example, in Giles v. Maryland,9 a prosecution for rape, the 
prosecutor withheld information concerning the conduct and statements 
of the alleged victim which, if presented to the jury, might have estab-
lished that the victim consented to the intercourse. However, the Court 
was unable to reach agreement as to the effect of the non-disclosure on 
the fairness of the defendant's trial, and chose instead to reverse the 
conviction on another ground. The Supreme Judicial Court responded 
in much the same way in Thompson: unconvinced that the withheld 
4 Id. at 1507, 286 N.E.2d at 336. 
5 Id. 
6 Mooney v. Holahan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935); Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 
(1942). 
7 355 U.S. 28 (1957). 
8 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Although there is an intimation in the Brady case 
that the duty to disclose must be triggered by a defense demand for information, 
there may be instances where there is a duty to disclose without a prior request. 
Thus in Gigl'io v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), it was error not to dis-
close that an assistant U.S. attorney had promised a nolle proseque to a key 
prosecution witness, although the case was tried by another assistant, who was 
not aware of the promise of leniency, and thus could not possibly have disclosed 
the information. 
9 386 U.S. 66 (1967). 
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infonnation was in fact exculpatory, the Court in effect held that the 
duty to disclose never arose. 
Commonwealth v. ThompsonlO also involved issues concerning the ad-
missibility at trial of pretrial identifications. These issues are discussed in 
detail elsewhere in this volume of the SURVEy;l1 suffice it to say here 
that the Court's response to these issues represents another area in which 
courts have been hard-pressed to define legal ideals in concrete tenns. 
Briefly, in Thompson the defendant challenged the admission into evi-
dence of the victims' pretrial identifications of him as the assailant, 
because such identifications were made under conditions which denied 
him due process of law. While strongly indicating that such evidence was 
constitutionally admissible, the Court held that even if admitting such 
evidence was improper, reversal· of the conviction was not required, 
since the error was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."12 
The use of the hannless error doctrine stems directly from the leading 
case of Chapman v. CaliforniaP in which the Supreme Court held that, 
even where there has been a clear infringement of the constitutional 
rights of an accused either before or during his trial, a conviction need 
not be reversed if it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the de-
fendant's chances at trial were not prejudiced by the error.14 Although 
this doctrine as an ideal is clear, the process of evaluating the presence 
of "prejudice" when constitutional rights have been infringed has not 
been clearly articulated and seems frequently to be part of a judicial 
mystique. For example, Mr. Justice Black's enunciation of the doctrine 
in Chapman indicated that it was a dangerous rule,15 and that errors 
should be strictly scrutinized before being labelled "harmless."16 Applying 
the doctrine in Chapman, the Court was not convinced that the prosecu-
tor's numerous references to the defendants' failure to take the stand 
were harmless. 
In spite of those earlier admonitions, recent applications of the hann-
less error doctrine have broadened its scope. In Milton v. Wainw.right17 
10 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1503, 286 N.E.2d 333. 
11 See U7.1-7.3, supra. 
12 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1503, 1505, 286 N.E. 333, 335. The basis upon which 
the Court considered the identifications to be "harmless error" is discussed infra. 
13 386 U.S. 18 (1967). 
14 The Court in Chapman thus modified the classic pronouncement of Judge 
Learned Hand that, where constitutional errors are present, there must be a 
reversal of the conviction even though the guilt of the defendant is clear. United 
States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1950). 
15 "In fashioning a harmless-constitutional-error rule, we must recognize that 
harmless-error rules can work very unfair and mischievous results when, for 
example, highly important and persuasive evidence, or argument, though legally 
forbidden, finds its way into a trial in which the question of guilt or innocence 
is a close one." 386 U.S. 18,22 (1967). 
16 "An error in admitting plainly relevant evidence which possibly influenced 
the jury adversely to a litigant cannot ••• be conceived of as harmless." (Em-
phasis added). Id. at 23-24. 
17 407 U.S. 371 (1972). 
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a conviction was challenged because one of four confessions introduced 
at the trial had been obtained unconstitutionally. Although this con-
fession was "plainly relevant evidence," and although it was the one 
most relied upon by the prosecution,18 the Supreme Court held that its 
admission was harmless error.19 The Supreme Judicial Court's approach 
to the pretrial identification evidence in Thompson was similar, and in 
other respects even broader than the Supreme Court's approach in 
Milton. The Court noted that two other witnesses identified the de-
fendant as the assailant and that the witnesses whose pretrial identifica-
tions were challenged had failed to identify the defendant at trial. This 
reasoning apparently assumes that the challenged evidence was harmless 
simply because it was contradicted by other evidence. Whether Thompson 
is an expansion of Milton is a question susceptible to differing views. 
However, it seems clear from these decisions that both courts have lost 
sight of Mr. Justice Black's admonition that "[a]n error in admitting 
plainly relevant evidence which possibly influenced the jury adversely 
to a litigant cannot ... be conceived of as harmless."2o 
Another "ideal" doctrine which is particularly difficult to apply to 
concrete factual situations is the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine.21 
According to this doctrine, evidence obtained as a result of an unconstitu-
tional act or procedure may not be used in a judicial proceeding.22 
However, even if constitutional rights have been infringed, evidence 
obtained "independently" of such infringement may be used.23 The 
problem of applying the doctrine is a problem of determining whether 
proffered evidence has an independent source. 
This particular problem of applying the "fruit of the poisonous tree" 
doctrine, usually confined to search and seizure or coerced confession 
cases, can be expected to arise shortly in the unlikely area of the privilege 
against self-incrimination. The Crime Control Act of 1970 provides that 
a witness may not refuse to give evidence on the ground of self-
incrimination if he is assured that no testimony and no information "di-
rectly or indirectly" derived from testimony will be used against him in 
a criminal prosecution.24 The question in applying this immunity statute 
should be exactly the same as the question in applying the "fruit of the 
poisonous tree" doctrine: whether the proffered evidence has a source 
which is independent of the testimony given under immunity. It is 
perhaps too early to generalize about the effect that the immunity statute 
18 Id. at 383 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
19 Id. at 378. 
20 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23-24 (1967). 
21 The phrase appears to have been first used by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in 
Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939), a wiretap case. 
22 Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920). In this 
case the government's attempt to justify a subpoena duces tecum with evidence 
obtained through an unreasonable search and seizure was rejected. 
23 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). 
24 18 U.S.C. §§6002 et seq. (1970). 
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and its interpretive problems may have on the administration of the 
criminal law or the privilege against self-incrimination. However, it 
should be safe to predict that courts will be faced with knotty problems 
in determining the "independence" of proffered evidence-problems that 
will depend as much upon the mental processes and state of knowledge 
of the obtainer of the evidence as upon the determination of concrete 
facts. 
It should be noted that the passage of the immunity provision of the 
1970 Crime Control Act worked a major change in the scope of im-
munity statutes. Such statutes have a long history, and have traditionally 
fallen into two categories. The first major federal immunity statute was 
enacted in 1868,and provided immunity against prosecution based on 
any testimony given under immunity.25 However in 1892 the Supreme 
Court, in Counselman v. Hitchcock,26 held that statute to be constitu-
tionally deficient. It was felt to be insufficiently protective of the privilege 
against self-incrimination since evidence derived from any testimony given 
under immunity could still be used in a criminal prosecution. In so 
holding, the Court expressed its opinion that "[i]n view of the constitu-
tional provision, a statutory enactment, to be valid, must afford absolute 
immunity against future prosecution for the offense to which the question 
relates." 27 
In response to Counselman, Congress in 1893 passed a new immunity 
statute of somewhat broader scope; basically the new statute granted 
immunity against prosecution for any transaction about which the wit-
ness might be required to testify.28 This broader immunity was held to 
be sufficiently protective of the privilege against self-incrimination.29 
The combined holdings of Counselman and Brown gave rise ,to a 
widespread belief that, to be valid, an immunity statute must grant 
transactional immunity and not just testimonial immunity.30 In fact, 
most state and federal immunity statutes enacted after Brown followed 
the transactional immunity pattern. Clearly, however, the immunity pro-
vision of the 1970 Crime Control Act, which prohibits prosecutions based 
on testimony given or on evidence obtained as a result of such testimony,31 
does not grant transactional immunity. In spite of this, during the 1972 
SURVEY year the Supreme Court upheld the Act's validity in Kastigar v, 
25 Immunity Act of 1868, 15 Stat. 37. The immunity so granted is commonly 
referred to as "testimonial immunity." 
26 142 U.S. 547 (1892). 
27 Id. at 586. 
28 Act of Feb. 11, 1893, 27 Stat. 443. The immunity so granted is commonly 
referred to as "transactional immunity." 
29 Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896). 
30 See Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956). 
31 18 U.S.C. §6002 (1970). This statute, enacted as Pub. L. No. 91-452, §201 
(a), 84 Stat. 927, repealed the 1893 immunity statute (27 Stat. 443). The immu-
nity granted by Section 6002 is commonly referred to as "use and derivative use 
immunity." 
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United States.32 The Court felt that the "use and derivative use im-
munity" was sufficiently protective of the privilege against self-
incrimination, which it characterized as affording "protection against 
being 'forced to give testimony leading to t:he infliction of "penalties 
affixed to ... criminal acts." , "33 The immunity was broad enough because 
"[iJt prohibits the prosecutorial authorities from using the compelled 
testimony in any respect, and it therefore insures that the testimony 
cannot lead to the infliction of criminal penalties on the witness."34 Nor 
was the Court swayed by the broad language from the Counselman opin-
ion ;35 such language was characterized as die tim, unnecessary for the 
Counselman holding, and not binding authority.36 
§18.5. Abortion: The interaction between legal doctrine and medical 
technology. The highly controversial and emotion-ridden issue of the 
validity of the Massachusetts abortion statute was presented in Common-
wealth v. Brunelle} a prosecution for performing an operation upon a 
pregnant woman for the purpose of inducing miscarriage.2 Before his 
superior court trial, the defendant brought a motion to dismiss, which 
presented the question of whether the statute, which fOI1bade the induce-
ment of abortion for purposes other than the elimination of danger to 
the life or health of the mother, exceeded the bounds of legislative power. 
The superior court judge denied the motion in an elaborate opinion.3 
The judge ruled that the restraints imposed upon a pregnant woman's 
liberty or right of privacy by preventing abortions solely for personal or 
socio-economic reasons are justified by a "compelling state interest" in 
the protection of pre-natal life. Moreover, he ruled, the extent to which 
the state will protect pre-natal life was solely a matter of legislative 
judgment. 
After trial and conviction, the defendant appealed to the Supreme 
32 406 U.S. 441 (1972). A similar resul't was reached with respect to a com-
parable state statute in Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Com. of Investigation, 406 
U.S. 472 (1972). 
33 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972), quoting Ullmann v. United States, 35~'S' 
422, 438-439 (1956), quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634 (18 . 
34 406 U.S. 441, '453 (1972). 
35 See note 27, supra. 
36 406 U.S. 441, 453-455 (1972). The Court also addressed itself in Kastigar --_ 
to the problems, discussed supra, of determining whether proffered evidence has a 
source independent of testimony given under a grant of immunity. The Court 
held that once a defendant "demonstrates" that he is being prosecuted for some-
thing "related to" previous testimony given under a grant of immunity, the prose-
cution has an "affirmative duty to prove that the evidence it proposes to use is 
derived from a legitimate source wholly independent of the compell'ed testimony." 
Id. at 460. However the Court gives no assurance that anything but a judicial 
mystique will be used to determine when the prosecutor's "affirmative duty" 
arises, or when it has been satisfied. 
§ 18.5. 1 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 131, 277 N.E.2d 826. 
2 The offense charged is defined in G.L., c. 272, § 19. 
3 Commonwealth v. Brunelle, Superior Court, Middlesex, No. 83879 (1970). 
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Judicial Court. The Court upheld the denial of the motion to dismiss, 
but it did not reach the constitutional issues. Rather it concluded that 
the defenda:nt had no standing to raise those issues4 because it appeared 
from the record that the defendant was not a licensed physicia:n. The 
defendant's conduct would therefore be unlawful even if abortion were 
a lawful medical procedure.5 Since "[o]nly persons whose interests are 
affected by a statute may assert that it is unconstitutional,"6 the plaintiff 
had no standing. 
Shortly after the Brunelle decision, on January 23, 1973, the Supreme 
Court held that a pregnant woman has a constitutionally protected right 
of privacy, which includes a right to terminate her pregna:ncy.' While 
this right was held not to be absolute, state restriction of its exercise 
must be based upon some "compelling state interest," such as the pro-
tection of the health of the woman or the protection of a viable fetus' 
life.8 Accordingly, the Court concluded that the abortion decision may 
be made by the woman and her physician in the first three months of 
pregna:ncy without state interference. During the second three months 
the state may regulate the abortion process only to the extent of requiring 
procedures calculated to protect the health of the mother. In the final 
three months, when the fetus has reached the state of "viability" (i.e., 
the capacity to live outside the womb), the Court conceded that the 
legislature might find a "compelling interest" sufficient to warra:nt a 
restriction to cases where the life or health of the woman is in danger. 
The abortion decisions9 will undoubtedly generate much comment 
a:nd controversy, and it is not the purpose here to a:nalyze them in great 
detaiJ.1o It should be noted, however, that the cases lay great emphasis 
upon medical technology. The Court attached weight to the fact that 
under the common law, as well as under the early doctrines of other 
legal systems, it was not an indictable offense to abort a fetus that had 
not "quickened." Abortion statutes, first enacted in the early and mid-
nineteenth century, are rationalized by the Court as a legislative recogni-
tion of the fact that abortion procedures of that period presented a serious 
threat to the life and health of the women upon whom they were per-
formed. Since modem medical technology has largely eliminated those 
4 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 131, 134-35, 277 N.E.2d 826, 830. 
5 The Court cited G.L., c. 112, §6, which forbids one who is not a licensed 
physician to perform a significant surgical or medical procedure. 
6 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 131, 134, 277 N.E.2d 826, 830. Since the defendant 
was in fact convicted under the abortion statute, and not for unauthorized prac-
tice of medicine, it is difficult to understand why his "interests" were not affected 
by the abortion statute. 
, Roe v. Wade, -U.S.-, 93 S.Ct. 705 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, -U.S.-, 93 
S.Ct. 739 (1973). 
8 The Court's rationale thus extends the "compelling state interest" doctrine 
from the equal protection area to the due process and .right to privacy areas. 
9 See note 7, supra. 
10 The cases were decided during the 1973 SURVEY year and will thus be 
analyzed in the 1973 Annual Survey. 
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risks, at least in the early stages C1f pregnancy,l1 the Court reasoned that 
the statutes have outlived their utility. At the same time, the Court 
declined to reo-examine the assumption which underlay the common law 
doctrine--that is, than an "unquickened" fetus is not a human life to 
be protected from pre-birth destruction. 
The process of evaluating legal doctrines in terms of medioal ad-
vances is certainly not new in the law. In 1787 an English court used 
the Rule Against Perpetuities to invalidate a gift to the daughters of 
John and Elizabeth Jee, which was contingent upon the failure of issue 
of Mary Hall,12 Although the J ees were both over age 70 when the gift 
was made, the court felt that they still might have another daughter 
who might tum out to be the sole beneficiary of the gift. The doctrine 
of the "fertile octogenerian" thus became firmly rooted in the law. In 
1934, however, the Supreme Court was asked to apply the Jee doctrine 
to a woman who had undergone surgery for removal of her vital re-
productive organs, and the Court refused.13 The attorney who opposed 
the doctrine in that case related that, in preparing his arguments, he 
ransacked law libraries without finding any persuasive rationale for the 
Jee doctrine.14 However, turning 'to medical libraries he discovered that 
the first ovariotomy took place in 1809, and that the development of 
ether as an anaesthetic in 1846 made abdominal surgery quite practicable 
at this early date. Thus it became clear that the legal doctrine of con-
tinued fertility was founded upon unwarranted medical premises. 
The parallelism between the demise of the J ee doctrine and the re-
cent demise of anti-abortion statutes is clear. When abortion of an 
unquickened fetus was first recognized as an indictable crime research 
had revealed few of the details of the biological progression from chromo-
some, to zygote, to embryo, to fetus. The legal doctrine thus evolved in 
ignorance of the facts to which it applied. Now medical technology has 
determined that abortion is no longer a dangerous procedure, and that 
viability is reached at approximately six months 'and that is the medical 
basis of the 1973 abortion decisions. It may well be that future develop-
ments in scientific research, involving such awesome medical procedures 
as uterine implants and transplants, will bring more information to bear 
on the nature of "nascent" life. That information may well require the 
1973 abortion cases to be reexamined. If it then appears that the abortion 
cases are inconsistent with medical fact, then they too should go the 
way of the fertile octogenarian. 
§18.6. Miscellaneous cases. On several occasions during the 1972 
SURVEY year, constitutional attacks were mounted successfully, in federal 
11 For example, the Court noted that a woman who aborts during the first 
trimester of pregnancy has a better chance of survival than one who carries 
through to term. Roe v. Wade, -U.S.-, 93 S.Ct. 705 (1973). 
12 Jee v. Audley, 29 Eng. Rep. ll86 (Chan. 1787). 
13 United States v. Provident Trust Co., 291 U.S. 272 (1934). 
14 Morris, What Law Books Mean to a Lawyer, 29 Law. Lib. J. 235, 238-239 
(1936). 
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court, on statutes, ordinances and administrative practices in Massachu-
setts. In United States v. State Tax Commission,l a state tax was held 
partially invalid as applied to federal savings and loan associations. State 
mutual savings banks are authorized to make loans secured by mortgages 
on land within the state or in contiguous states within a radius of fifty 
miles from the main office of the institution.2 Federal savings and loan 
associations may extend their mortgage loan operations into contiguous 
states within a radius of 100 miles from the association's main office.3 
The Massachusetts Bank Excise Tax Act4 imposes a tax on the average 
amount of the bank's deposits and allows a deduction of the unpaid 
balance on loans secured by mortgage of land ·within the Commonwealth 
or of land in a contiguous state within a radius of fifty miles from the 
bank's main office. It was stipulated in the case that federal savings and 
loan associations in Massachusetts had loan balances of nearly 
$500,000,000 secured by mortgaged land in other states located between 
50 and 100 miles from the associations' main offices. Under the statute, 
however, the federal associations were not entitled to deduct those amounts 
from total deposits in determining their tax liability. The district court 
held that the denial of this deduction violated a provision of the federal 
banking law which proscribes a state from imposing upon a federal 
association any tax "greater than that imposed ... on [similar state 
banks],"5 In effect, the court found that denying a deduction for the 
full amount of a federal savings and loan association's outstanding loans 
resulted in a higher excise tax rate than that imposed upon state banks. 
Since the state tax conflicted with federal law, it was invalid under the 
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.6 Further, the court ruled that 
the excise tax ran counter to the Commerce Clause. Apparently reason-
ing that, as a result of the non-deductibility of balances on loans made 
beyond a fifty-mile radius, federal savings and loan associations would 
be reluctant to make such loans, the court ruled that the excise tax 
inhibited the interstate flow of mortgage loan funds.7 
Boucher v. Minte~ was a class action brought in behalf of beneficiaries 
§ 18.6. 1 348 F. Supp. 397 (D. Mass. 1972). 
2 G.L., c. 168, §34 defines this area for mutual savings banks. G.L., c. 170, 
§23 permits cooperative banks to extend only 25 miles into contiguous states. 
3 12 U.S.C. §1464(c) (1970). 
4 G.L., c. 63, §11. 
5 12 U.S.C. §1464(h) (1970). 
6 348 F. Supp. 397, 400 (D. Mass. 1972). 
7 Id. 
s 349 F .. Supp. 1240 (D. Mass. 1972). In this case a three-judge district 
court was convened to adjudicate the constitutionality of a state administrative 
regulation, despite the fact that 28 U.S.C. §2281 (1970) requires such a three-
judge court to be convened only when a statute is under attack. This follows 
from the case of Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Russell, 261 U.S. 290 (1923), in 
which the Supreme Court held that the policy behind Section 2281 requires the 
convening of a three-judge court to restrain enforcement of an administrative 
policy that has state-wide application. This enlargement of the literal mandate 
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of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)9 whose mothers 
had remarried and were living with their new spouses. AFDC funds are 
distributed by the Massachusetts Department of Public Welfare, which 
has promulgated schedules that separately indicate the amount of bene-
fits for shelter allocated to AFDC recipients. The schedules further pro-
vide that upon the AFDC recipient's remarriage and cohabitation with 
her new spouse, shelter benefits for her children shall be terminated. This 
regulation was apparently promulgated on the assumption that the step-
father would provide the shelter formerly financed by AFDC. However, 
in Massachusetts a stepfather is not legally obligated to support his 
stepchildren. lO Since a stepfather may lawfully decline to provide shelter 
for his stepcnildren, the court concluded that the basic assumption could 
not apply. To apply an irrebuttable presumption that AFDC children 
would be supported by a new stepfather and to cut off shelter benefits 
on that account was to deprive the children of property without due 
process of law,11 The schedules were also held to deny equal protection, 
since funds were automatically cut off only when a stepfather moved in, 
but not when another relative moved in.12 
Rozecki v. Gaughan13 presented an unusual invocation of the Civil 
Rights Act,14 Persons who had been involuntarily committed to the Treat-
ment Center at Bridgewater brought an action against the administrators 
of the center, alleging that the heating of the building in which they 
were confined was "grossly inadequate," in consequence of which they 
suffered personal ills and severe personal discomfort. The complaint 
alleged that the lack of heating constituted cruel and unusual treatment. 
The respondents argued that the heating plant was old and incapable 
of adequate regulation, and that the deficiencies complained of existed 
despite the defendant's best efforts to supply sufficient heat. The district 
court dismissed the complaint, but the court of appeals reversed. With-
out deciding whether the good faith of the defendants would save them 
from liability for damages, the court concluded that the complaint was 
at least sufficient to state a claim for equitable relief. The plaintiffs' 
constitutional rights were invaded if the treatment was in fact cruel, 
regardless of the absence of bad will or evil purpose on the part of the 
defendants. IS The practical consequence of such a ruling may be that 
of the statute substantial'ly increased the demands upon federal district courts. 
Ironically, some members of the Supreme Court are now advocating the abandon-
ment of three-judge district courts, which are seen as contribuing to the over-
burdening of the federal judiciary system. 
9 42 U.S.C. §§602(a) (7), 606(a) (1970). 
10 349 F. Supp, 1240, 1241 (D. Mass. 1972), citing Worcester v. Marchant, 31 
Mass. (14 Pick.) 510 (1834). 
11 349 F. Supp. 1240, 1244-45 (D. Mass. 1972). 
12 Id. at 1245. 
13 459 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1972). 
14 42 U.S.C. §1983 (1970). 
15 459 F.2d 6, 7-8 (1st Cir. 1972). In the district court the case had been 
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the Commonwealth will be put to the choice of providing adequate facil-
ities or losing its right to confine persons involuntarily in the existing 
facility. 
Wulp v. Corcoran16 represented a challenge to a Cambridge ordinance 
that prohibited the peddling of newspapers without a permit and an 
identification badge. Plaintiffs, who wished to sell various printed pub-
lications on the streets of Cambridge, had been threatened with arrest 
and otherwise harassed because they did not hold permits or exhibit 
badges; although none had yet been arrested or prosecuted for violating 
the ordinance, prosecution was the prescribed sanction for violations. 
The district court denied relief on the ground that the proper remedy 
was to raise the constitutional claims in defense of a criminal prosecu-
tion in a state court, but the circuit court of appeals reversed. Although 
a line of cases headed by Younger v. Harris17 seemed to curtail the inter-
position of federal courts into state criminal procedure by requiring con-
stitutional claims to be raised first in state court criminal proceedings, 
the circuit court ruled that those cases did not apply to Wulp. Its opin-
ion emphasized that (1) Younger was a challenge to criminal statutes by 
plaintiffs whose interests had not yet heen noticeably affected,18 whereas 
the plaintiffs in Wulp had all been threatened with arrest under the 
statute they challenged; and (2) no criminal prosecutions were pending 
against the plaintiffs, so that an application of the Younger doctrine 
would defer the prompt determination of F~rst Amendment rights.19 
Turning to the merits, the circuit court found the ordinance invalid 
on its face. Focusing on the ordinance's requirement that an identifica-
tion badge be worn by newspaper peddlers, the court held that the 
peddlers' right of anonymity, an adjunct of the First Amendment's free-
dom of the press, had been curtailed.2o Nor did the court accept the 
defendant's argument that the ordinance was used merely as a device 
referred to a magistrate, who based his judgment for the defendant on a hearing 
and on an exculpatory memorandum submitted by defense counsel. The district 
court judge adopted the magistrate's decision without giving plaintiffs notice of 
his intention to do so or an opportunity for a hearing. Although the circuit 
court reversed the dismissal on the merits, it also noted some reservations as to 
the propriety of the district court procedure. Id. at 8. 
16 454 F.2d 826 (1st Cir. 1972). 
17 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Cases following Younger include Boyle v. Landry, 401 
U.S. 77 (1971) (upon which the district court in Wulp relied); Samuels v. 
Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971); Dyson v. 
Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971); and Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971). 
18 "The Court [in Younger] noted that feelings of 'inhibition', without any claim 
of a threat of prosecution, or that a prosecution was likely or even remotely 
possible, are entirely too 'imaginary or speculative' to establish standing." 454 
F.2d 826, 830 (1st Cir. 1972). 
19 Id. at 830-32. 
20 Id. at 834, citing TaUey v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960). See also 
Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959), which held that First Amendment 
protections must be afforded even if the disseminator is seeking commercial gain. 
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for traffic control in Harvard Square; the ordinance was not sufficiently 
narrow to focus on that objective.21 
In Bray v. Lee22 an administrative act of the Boston School Com-
mittee was also invalidated. The highest quality secondary education 
available in Boston is offered in the Latin schools, admission to which 
is determined by a competitive examination. Boys and girls are housed 
in separate buildings, known respectively as Latin School and Girls 
Latin School. The former has a substantially larger seating capacity, 
and the examination score required for admission is keyed to the number 
of seats available for each sex. As a result, in 1970 the critical score for 
admission to Latin School was 120 points while the critical score for 
admission to Girls Latin School was 133 points. Thus girls who scored 
between 120 and 132 were denied admission, while boys with the same 
score were admitted. This disparity was held a denial of equal pro-
tection; the court found that female applicants "have been illegally dis-
criminated against solely because of their sex, and that discrimination 
has denied them their constitutional right to an education equal to that 
offered to male students at the Latin school."23 
Although the case was not instituted until after the beginning of 
classes in 1970, the case was not moot since it appeared that it was 
possible for a student to be admitted to the Latin schools for the ninth 
through twelfth gmdes. Accordingly, the court ruled that, to the extent 
that ninth-grade seats were available in either school, girls who had 
been discriminatorily refused admission in 1970 at the seventh-grade 
level should be admitted to either school at the ninth-grade level in 1972. 
As an interesting sidelight, the defendant suggested that the court 
should abstain because the legislature had enacted a statute forbidding 
the exclusion of any child from any school on the basis, among others, 
of sex.24 In declining the invitation, the court took judicial notice of the 
pendency of another bill that would exempt the Latin schools from the 
new statute. Taking a cynical view, the court indicated that it lacked 
confidence in voluntary compliance with the new requirements. 25 
STUDENT COMMENT 
§18.7. Criminal contempt: Right to trial by jury and prohibition of 
multiple punishments for single offenses. Within the last decade and 
a half, the law regarding the right to jury trial for criminal contempt of 
court has undergone fundamental change after a long history which had 
21 See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
22 337 F. Supp. 934 (D. Mass. 1972). 
23 Id. at 937. 
24 Acts of 1971, c. 622, amending C.L., c. 76, §5. 
25 "[T]he mere existence of a law, unfortunately, is no guarantee that it 
will be complied with by all' persons subject thereto." 337 F. Supp. 934, 937 (D. 
Mass. 1972). 
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essentially precluded jury trial in this area'! Today, where the alleged 
contempt is deemed "serious," a defendant is entitled to a jury trial;2 
and among the criteria by which "seriousness" is established is whether 
a sentence of more than six months imprisonment has been imposed.3 
These developments have given rise to a series of new questions for 
cases in which the alleged contempt lies in a continuing course of con-
duct-refusal to answer questions under oath, for example, or repeated 
disruption of court proceedings-rather than in an isolated act. Maya 
court, ostensibly to circumvent the jury requirement, find multiple con-
tempts and impose a series of sentences, each one of six months or 
less, but running consecutively? If so, what standards govern the division 
of conduct into separately indictable units? 
Some of these problems surfaced recently in the Commonwealth in the 
case of Baker v. Eisenstadt.4 The original matter was a criminal informa-
tion presented on October 4, 1971 against Edward De Saulnier, Jr., an 
associate justice of the Massachusetts Superior Court, for alleged judicial 
misconduct. According to the charges, Judge De Saulnier had in 1962 
agreed with 1. Charles Baker, a surety bail bondsman, to insure a favor-
able judicial result in certain criminal cases in return for a sum of 
money. Baker, when later subpoenaed to testify at a hearing inquiring 
into the charges of misconduct, moved to quash the subpoena, asserting 
that his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination would be 
violated if he were compelled to testify. In response to this claim, the 
Middlesex County District Attorney, acting in concert with the Attorney 
General of the Commonwealth, made offers to Baker purporting to 
guarantee absolute immunity from prosecution. Baker and his counsel 
were not satisfied with the offers. The Supreme Judicial Court meanwhile 
denied Baker's Fifth Amendment claim, holding that for Baker to testify 
as to events prior to January 1, 1965 would involve him in no risk of 
self-incrimination.5 Baker nevertheless remained adamant, refusing to 
answer any of the thirty-five questions asked of him and relying at all 
times on the claimed privilege. 
The Court held Baker in contempt for refusal to answer thirty-three 
of the thirty-five questions.6 Each refusal was considered a separate con-
tempt with the total number being divided into five groups for purposes 
of sentencing. Baker received a sentence of five months imprisonment for 
each failure to answer a question in Group I, the sentences to run con-
currently. For the four remaining groups, the Court imposed a six month 
sentence for each refusal, the sentences to run concurrently within each 
group and consecutively as to the groups themselves, including Group 
§ 18.7. 1 Compare Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165 (1958), with Bloom 
v. IHinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968). 
2 Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 198-202 (1968). 
3 Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970). 
4 456 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1972). 
5 In reDeSaulnier, 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1689,276 N.E.2d 278 (1971). 
6 In re DeSaulnier, 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1817, 279 N.E.2d 287 (1971). 
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I. The aggregate time to be served amounted to twenty-nine months. 
Baker claimed that even if his claim of privilege was mistaken, his 
refusal to testify constituted only one contempt and not several; that 
the twenty-nine month aggregate sentence, being multiple punishment 
for a single contempt, placed him in double jeopardy; and that the 
Court's summary imposition of a twenty-nine month sentence for a single 
offense also violated his constitutional right to trial by jury. The Su-
preme Judicial Court held that each of Baker's refusals to answer was a 
separate offense; that for separate distinct offenses, cumulative punish-
ments are constitutionally permissible; and that therefore the aggregate 
sentence of twenty-nine months did not place Baker in double jeopardy. 
In so holding, the Court reasoned that no question put to Baker was 
repetitive, but that each sought to elicit new facts, and that Baker had 
failed initially to "carve out an area of refusal." The Court further 
held that since no more than six months imprisonment was imposed for 
anyone contempt, each offense must be considered "petty" for jury 
trial purposes, and that therefore Baker had no constitutional right to 
trial by jury. 
Baker's petition for habeas corpus was denied by the Massachusetts 
Federal District Court, hut the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
reversed.7 In doing so the court found that although the Supreme Judi-
cial Court was correct in holding that the absolute immunity offered 
Baker extinguished whatever privilege against self-incrimination he 
would have had, the Massachusetts court erred in treating each refusal 
to answer as a separate offense for which cumulative penalties could 
be imposed. In finding only one contempt in Baker's refusal to testify, 
the court reasoned that although Baker had not initially stated expressly 
that he would not answer any questions, his prior statements and actions, 
together with his reliance on the Fifth Amendment, clearly indicated at 
the outset of questioning that he would not testify on the subject at 
hand. The original refusal to testify said the court, was the sole contempt 
committed. And since the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double 
jeopardy as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, 
protects against multiple punishment for the same offense, the cumula-
tive penalties imposed on Baker constituted a denial of due process. 
The court of appeals acknowledged the doctrine that even where a 
defendant has failed to "carve out an area of refusal," his refusal to 
answer several questions will constitute only one contempt where those 
questions pertain to but a single subject of inquiry.8 The court declined 
to analyze the case in terms of this issue, however, citing the unavoidable 
arbitrariness attendant upon categorizing information in terms of subject 
matter. 
Since the court's disposition of the case reduced Baker's sentence to a 
point beyond the purview of the Sixth Amendment's requirement of 
7 Baker v. Eisenstadt, note 4, supra. 
8 See, e.g., United States v. Onnan, 207 F.2d 148 (3rd Cir. 1953). 
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jury trial, the court did not reach the issue of whether the aggregation 
of six month sentences for separate contempts tried without a jury is a 
denial of constitutional right. 
The decision of the court of appeals in Baker and the other issues sug-
gested therein raise serious problems for Massachusetts and other state 
courts concerning the permissible treatment of defendants in criminal 
contempt cases. This article will re-examine the law of contempt in light 
of several recent cases, both state and federal, which, like Bake'1', have 
gone far toward drastically changing the law in this area. Analysis and 
criticism of these cases will focus primarily on the effect on criminal 
contempt cases of the right to trial by jury and the prohibition of 
multiple punishments for single offenses. 
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONTEMPT POWER 
Since its original development in the English ecclesiastical courts and 
its later adoption by the courts of equity,9 the power to punish for con-
tempt has been considered inherent in the courts and dependent for its 
existence on neither constitutional nor legislative 'authority.lO It is re-
gardedas necessary for the preservation of order in judicial proceedings 
and as essential to the enforcement of judgments and other court orders.11 
Originally, the law of contempt was purely criminal in nature.12 The 
sanction of imprisonment was imposed only for conduct constituting 
active interference with the court or with official agents of the crown. 
Gradually however, the contempt power took on civil aspects. The courts 
began to imprison defendants in civil cases 'as an equitable procedural 
device to secure obedience to court orders.13 The distinctions which 
developed at common law between what came to be known as "civil 
contempt" and "criminal contempt" are still operative today. Basically 
criminal con tempts are deliberate acts in disrespect of the court or in 
obstruction of the administration of justice. l 4- Since the injury is to the 
courts, and therefore to society, such acts are in effect public offenses 
and very much like ordinary crimes. The contempt proceeding vindicates 
9 See c. LANGDELL, A BRIEF SURVEY OF EQUITY JURISDICTION 25-26 (1st ed. 
1905) . 
10 "The process of attachment for these and the like contempts must necessarily 
be as ancient as the laws themselves; for laws without a competent authority to 
secure their administration from disobedience and contempt would be vain and 
nugatory." 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 286. As early as 1812 the United 
States Supreme Court held that U[clertain implied powers must necessarily re-
sult to our courts of justice, from the nature of their institution. . . . To fine 
for contempt, imprison for contumacy, to enforce the observance of order. . .• " 
United States v. Hudson and Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 31,34 (1812). 
11 Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall) 505,510 (1873). 
12 See Goldfarb, The Varieties of the Contempt Power, 13 Syracuse L. Rev. 44, 
47 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Goldfarbl. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 48, citing RAPALJE, A TREATISE ON CONTEMPT 24 (1884). 
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the dignity and authority of the court, punishes the defendant and deters 
others from similar conduct. The imprisonment cannot undo the past 
damage and so is unconditional and for a fixed period.15 Civil contempts 
on the other hand consist of refusals or failures to do that which the 
court requires for the benefit of private parties.16 The contempt involves 
merely passive inaction regarding civil obligations and results only in 
private injury. Here, imprisonment is not punitive but remedial. Since 
the objective is the defendant's compliance with the court's order, the 
sentence is conditional. The defendant "carries the keys of his prison 
in his own pocket."17 Generally, the nature of the defendant's conduct, 
the purpose of the contempt proceedings against him, and the type of 
punishment imposed determine whether the contempt is civil or criminal.18 
Contempts were further distinguished in common law England as 
either direct or indirect, and this categorization is still relevant in the 
United States. Direct contempts are those committed within the presence 
and cognizance of the court.19 Conduct is "in the presence" of the court 
15 See Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370 n.5 (1966); Chefi' v. 
Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373,377 (1966); Comment, 69 U. Mich. L. Rev. 1549, 
1551 (1971). 
16 Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 368 (1966). 
17 Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 442 (1911). This 
phrase originated in Williamson's Case, 26 Pa. 9, 24 (1855), and has been widely 
repeated by both state and federal courts. 
18 See Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 447-49 (1911). 
See generaHy Goldfarb, note 12, supra. 
The distinction between civil and criminal contempt is important in that it 
will determine what procedural safeguards, if any, are available at the contempt 
proceeding. However, it is often difficult to distinguish one from the other. 
Indeed, courts in many jurisdictions indicate that it is not necessary to classify 
contempts as either wholly civil or wholly criminal. In Massachusetts, for exampl'e, 
the Supreme Judicial Court has said that "Massachusetts law has long refused 
to distinguish rigidly between the civil and criminal aspects of contempt of 
court. . . . A sentence for contempt in Massachusetts may be 'partly remedial 
and partly punitive partaking both of civil' and criminal features'." In re 
DeSaulnier, 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1817, 1819, 279 N.E.2d 287, 289 (1971). See 
also, Root v. MacDonald, 260 Mass. 344, 157 N.E. 684 (1927). 
The problem of differentiating between civil and criminal contempt is strikingly 
presented when an individual without privilege refuses to testify in a judicial 
proceeding. Such conduct has aspects of both civil and criminal contempt. See, 
e.g., Baker v. Eisenstadt, 456 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1972); People v. Riela, 7 N.Y.2d 
571, 200 N.Y.S.2d 43, 166 N.E.2d 840 (1960); People v. Saperstein, 2 N.Y.2d 
210, 159 N.Y.S.2d 160, 140 N.E.2d 252 (1957). Cases have held that a single 
act may constitute either a civil or a criminal contempt depending on the court's 
inclination. See Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., supra; Bessete v. W. B. 
Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324 (1904). Others have found that the same act can 
constitute both a civil and a criminal contempt and can be punished as both. 
Yates v. United States, 355 U.S. 66, 74-75 (1957); United States v. United 
Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 303-04 (1947). 
The law of contempt in this area is presently in a state of confusion. In many 
instances, the traditional distinctions provide little guidance in apprising an in-
dividual whether certain contemplated action will be viewed as civil or criminal. 
19 Goldfarb, note 12, supra, at 60, 61. A direct contempt need not be a violent 
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when it occurs either in the courtroom itself (actual presence) or so 
near to the courtroom as to have an actual as opposed to only a specula-
tive or remotely causal effect on the court's business.2o Absent a statute 
to the contrary, a direct contempt is punished summarily and without 
a trial of any sort.21 Since the offense is observed by the court in all its 
nuances, the court's knowledge of the facts supplies the necessary proof 
for conviction. Any formal proceeding to determine guilt would be un-
necessary.22 Furthermore, courts see a need for immediate action on 
direct contempts to preserve order in the courtroom.23 
Indirect con tempts are acts, conduct, or inaction which occur outside 
the court's presence but which nevertheless tend to obstruct the adminis-
tration of justice.24 They are also defined as any contempt about which 
the court has no first hand knowledge.25 Indirect contempts cannot be 
or disruptive act. A polite refusal to cooperate with the court, as in the refusal 
to testify cases, may suffice. See, e.g., Yates v. United States, note 18, supra; 
Baker v. Eisenstadt, note 18, supra; People v. Riela, note 18, supra. 
20 Goldfarb, note 12, supra, at 61. See also Note, Legislative Contempt and 
Due Process: The Groppi Cases, 46 Ind. L.J. 480, 489 (1971). 
21 Goldfarb, note 12, supra at 61. 
22 Id. See also Comment, 69 U. Mich. L. Rev. 1549 (1971), at 1553 n. 32, 
1564; Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517,536 (1925). 
Some recent cases question whether it is in fact true that in all cases of 
direct contempt there are no fact questions left undetermined. In one such case, 
Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162, 166 (1965), in which the contempt con-
sisted of refusals to testify, the Court noted that "[w]hat appears to be a brazen 
refusal to cooperate with the grand jury may indeed be a case of frightened 
silence. Refusal to answer may be due to fear-fear of reprisals on the witness or 
his family. Other extenuating circumstances may be present." The Court went 
on to say that under these circumstances only a hearing, given after timely 
notice, would "elucidate all the facts and assure a fair administration of justice." 
At 167. A similar comment was made by the court in Baker v. Eisenstadt, note 
18, supra, at 394-95. 
Although in cases of direct contempt there can be no dispute as to whether 
or not the particular acts or conduct took place, only a formal trial' will enable 
the defendant to introduce evidence of facts which are relevant either to the 
issue of complete exculpation or in extenuation of the offense and in mitigation 
of the penalty to be imposed. 
23 Where the contempt is a refusal to testify there is no such need for imme-
diate action to preserve order. This was recognized by the court in United States 
v. Pace, 371 F.2d 810, 811 (2d Cir. 1967), where the court held that "[s]ummary 
disposition is thus available only when immediate punishment is necessary to put 
an end to acts disrupting the proceedings. . . . It is not a remedy to be used 
in a case . . . where the contempt consists of no more than orderly refusal . . . 
to answer a question on Fifth Amendment grounds before the taking of any 
testimony." Cf. Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162 (1965). The court's 
holding in Pace was based on a particular interpretation of Rule 42 (a) of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and not on the Constitution, and hence its 
applicability does not extend to state courts. See Baker v. Eisenstadt, 456 F.2d 
382, 388 (1972). 
24 See Goldfarb, note 12, supra, at 60. 
25 See Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212 (1971). 
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punished summarily. They require a formal hearing in which the de-
fendant is provided all the procedural safeguards required by due pro-
cess,26 including timely notice of the charges, a reasonable opportunity to 
be heard, the right to assistance of counsel, and the right to call wit-
nesses in his behalf.27 
The early history of summary process in contempt cases is in some 
dispute, but it is clear that by the late 17th century, contempt cases in 
England were being tried either summarily or before the court without 
a jury.28 Our Constitution was framed in the language of the English 
common law, and its provisions must be read in the light of common 
law history.29 Thus, when the framers of the Constitution provided in 
Article III that "the trial of all crimes . . . shall be by jury" and in the 
Sixth Amendment that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury ... ," 
they did not intend to include within the meaning of "crimes" and 
"criminal prosecutions" either petty offenses30 or contempts31 (whether 
"petty" or not32). That the framers did not intend that a defendant have 
the right to jury trial in contempt cases is supported by the fact that 
the Judiciary Act of 1789, which stated that federal courts "shall have 
power to ... punish by fine or imprisonment, at the discretion of said 
courts, all contempts of authority ... ," was enacted by a Congress whose 
Judiciary Committee was composed mainly of members of the Constitu-
tional Convention who were responsible for writing Article III and the 
Sixth Amendment.33 
In colonial America around the time of the adoption of the Constitu-
26 Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 205 (1968); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 
275 (1948); Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 537 (1925). 
27 Id, 
28 See Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 185-87 (1958); compare 202-03 
(Black, J., dissenting). See also Frankfurter and Landis, Power to Regulate Con-
tempts, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 1010, 1042-52 (1926); Beale, Contempt of Court, 21 
Harv. L. Rev. 161, 164, 169-71 (1908). 
29 Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 478 (1888). See also Eilenbecker v. District 
Court, 134 U.S. 31, 36 (1890), in which the Court said: "If it has ever been 
understood that proceedings according to the common law for contempt of court 
have been subject to the right of trial by jury, we have been unable to find any 
instance of it." 
30 See District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 624-25 (1937); Schick 
v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 68-70 (1904). 
31 In Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165 (1958), Justice Harlan, speaking 
for the Court commented that: "[T]his Court has never deviated from the 
view that the constitutional guarantee of trial by jury for 'crimes' and 'criminal 
prosecutions' was not intended to reach to criminal contempts." Id. at 186. See 
also Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion. Id. at 191 n.2. 
32 See United States v. Barnett, 376 U. S. 681, 694 n.12 (1964) for a list 
of Supreme Court cases which until 1964 supported the summary disposition of 
contempts, without trial by jury and without reference to any distinction based 
on the serious or petty nature of the offense. 
33 Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 186 (1958). 
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tion the contempt power was a relatively minor part of our law. It was 
seldom used and was then only attended by trivial penalties.34 Gradually, 
however, the judiciary-both state and federal-began to employ the 
handy device of criminal contempt with greater frequency and the 
punishments imposed became more severe. The contempt power, with 
its essentially arbitrary procedures, was gradually transformed into a 
dangerous judicial weapon sometimes used despotically. This trend 
became notorious in 1831 in the case of Judge Peck who summarily ad-
judged a lawyer in contempt of court, disbarred, and imprisoned him 
for writing an article criticizing one of Peck's decisions that was then 
pending on appeal. Congress was outraged by this abuse of the contempt 
power and as a result instituted impeachment proceedings against Judge 
Peck.35 The public sentiment for limiting the court's contempt power 
which arose out of the impeachment proceedings led to the Judiciary Act 
of 183136 which confined the summary power of punishment to "misbe-
havior of any person . . . in the presence of the courts, or so near thereto 
as to obstruct the administration of justice .... " While the Act made 
no mention of a right to trial by jury, it did change then existing law by 
requiring that in cases of indirect contempt a defendant must be granted 
a formal hearing before the court in order for his conviction of contempt 
to be valid. More recently, other statutes have given a limited right to 
jury trial in certain classes of contempt cases,37 and still others have 
limited the punishment for contempt in certain situations.38 In 1964, 
Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Crimina:l Procedure was enacted. A 
34 "[llt appears that alleged offenders were I'et off after an apology, a reprimand 
or a small fine or other relatively slight punishment. I have found no instance 
where anyone was unconditionally imprisoned for even a term of months, let 
alone years, during that era when extremely harsh penalties were otherwise 
commonplace." Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 207 n.21 (Black, J., 
dissenting) . 
Contrast the rather severe penal'ties often imposed today. In Green, for instance, 
the Supreme .court upheld a conviction for contempt of court, without trial 
by jury, and a sentence of three years imprisonment. 
35 For a detailed account see A. STANSBURY, REPORT OF THE TRIAL OF JAMES 
H. PECK (1833); see also Nelles and King, Contempt by Publication in the 
United States, 28 Colum. L. Rev. 401, 423-30 (1928). 
36 Act of 1831, ch. 99,4 Stat. 487. 
37 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§402, 3691 (1970) (jury trial in criminal contempt 
proceedings where the act in question constitutes a separate criminal offense 
under either state or federal law); 18 U.S.C. §3692 (1970) (jury trial in 
criminal contempt cases arising out of I'abor disputes); .civil Rights Act of 1957 
§l51, 42 U.S.C. §l995 (1970) (mandatory jury trial de novo where sentence 
exceeds 45 days for criminal contempt arising under the Act); Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, §1101, 42 U.S.C. §2000h (1970) (in any criminal contempt proceeding 
under the Act, the contempt must have been shown to be intentional and the 
maximum sentence may not exceed six months.). 
38 See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. 1848 (1970) (punishment not to exceed confinement for 
30 days or a fine of $100, or both, for contempts committed in military courts); 
22 U.S.C. §703 (1970) (concerning service courts of friendly foreign forces, 
limits punishment to a fine of $2,000 or six months imprisonment or both.) 
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successor to the Judiciary Act of 1831, it narrowed the scope of direct 
contempts to include only those acts committed "in the actual presence 
of the court."39 It also increased the number of specific procedural pro-
tections afforded defendants in indirect contempt proceedings.40 While 
these changes were taking place in the federal system, state statutes 
were also limiting the punishment which could be imposed for con tempts 
and in some instances were providing a right to trial by jury.41 
In addition to these legislative developments, the courts were also 
moving to limit the potential for abuse inherent in the summary power 
to punish for contempt. The Supreme Court in Compers v. Bucks Stove 
& Range Co.42 held that "in proceedings for criminal contempt the 
defendant is presumed to be innocent, he must be proved to be guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt, and cannot be compelled to testify against 
himself."43 Later, Cooke v. United States44 ruled that in the prosecution 
of a criminal contempt other than one committed in open court due 
process required that an accused be advised of the charges against him, 
that he have a reasonable opportunity to meet them, that he have the 
right to 3iSsistance of counsel, if requested, and that he be allowed to 
call witnesses in his own behalf.45 In re Oliver46 further recognized that 
the defendant in criminal contempt proceedings is entitled to a public 
trial before an unbiased judge. 
And yet, although statutes and cases had over the years severely re-
stricted the power of the courts in contempt cases while steadily increasing 
the number of procedural safeguards, the Supreme Court could say as 
late as 1958 that "criminal contempts are not subject to jury trial as a 
matter of constitutional right."47 The 1960s, however, brought a great 
change in the Court's traditional outlook on this subject. United States v. 
Barnett48 gave the first intimation that the Court would soon be willing 
to find a constitutional right to jury trial in contempt cases. This case 
arose as the result of the actions of Ross Barnett, then governor of 
Mississippi who, in denying James Meredith admission to the University 
of Mississippi, violated an injunction of the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals. The case was certified to the Supreme Court on the question of 
whether, under the particular facts presented, the Clayton Act entitled 
the defendant to trial by jury. The Court held that Barnett could be 
39 Fed. R. Crim. P. 42 (a) (Emphasis added). 
40 See Fed. R. Crim. P. 42(b). 
41 See Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 206-07 n.8 (1968); see also Note, 
Constitutional Law: The Supreme Court Constructs a Limited Right to Trial 
by Jury for Federal Criminal Contemnors, 1967 Duke L.J. 632, 654 n.84. 
42 221 U.S. 418 (1911). 
43 Id. at 444. 
44 267 U.S. 517 (1925). 
45 Id. at 537. 
46 333 U.S. 257 (1948). 
47 Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 183 (1958). 
48 376 U.S. 681 (1964). 
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punished for contempt without the intervention of a jury, but went on 
to add by way of dictum that "[s]ome members of the Court are of the 
view that, without regard to the seriousness of the offense, punishment 
by summary trial without a jury would be constitutionally limited to 
that penalty provided for petty offenses."49 Two years later, the Court, 
in Chelf v. Schnackenberg,50 was called upon to decide whether, after 
denying the petitioner's demand for jury trial in a criminal contempt 
proceeding in federal court, a sentence of six months imprisonment was 
constitutionally permissible under Article III and the Sixth Amendment. 
The Court, without deciding whether criminal contempts were "crimes" 
or "criminal prosecutions," found that the petitioner's offense was a 
"petty" one for which a jury trial was not constitutionally required. The 
Court went on to add, however, that under its supervisory power over 
the lower federal courts, it was establishing the rule that henceforth 
criminal contempt sentences exceeding six months' imprisonment might 
not be imposed absent a jury trial or a waiver thereof.51 
The most important case in this development was Bloom v. Illinois.52 
The petitioner in Bloom had been convicted in Illinois of criminal con-
tempt and sentenced to two years imprisonment for willfully petitioning 
to admit to probate a fraudulent will prepared and executed after the 
putative testator's death. His request for a jury trial had been refused 
by the trial court and the Illinois Supreme Court had affirmed his 
conviction. The United States Supreme Court found that criminal con-
tempt is a crime in every essential respect and that serious criminal 
contempts are so nearly like other serious crimes that they are subject 
to the Constitution's jury trial provisions.53 Having already held, in 
Duncan v. Louisiana,54 that the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial was 
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court 
in Bloom reversed and remanded. In doing so it held that since the 
petitioner was sentenced to two years imprisonment, his offense must 
be considered "serious" for jury trial purposes. The Court chose to look 
to the penalty actually imposed to determine whether an offense was 
"serious" or "petty," and therefore, whether a jury trial was constitu-
tionally required.55 It was not known until Baldwin v. New York,56 
49 Id. at 695 n.12. 
50 384 U.S. 373 (1966). 
51 Since the Court's ruling was not based on constitutional grounds, it had no 
application to the states. 
52 391 U.S. 194 (1968). 
53 Id. at 198-202. 
54 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
55 "Our analysis of Barnett ..• and Chelf . .. makes it clear that criminal 
contempt is not a crime of the sort that requires the right to jury trial regardless 
of the penalty involved. Under the rule in Chelf, when the legislature has not 
expressed a judgment as to the seriousness of an offense by fixing a maximum 
penalty which may be imposed, we are to look to the penalty actually imposed 
as the best evidence of the seriousness of the offense." 391 U.S. at 211. 
The dissenters felt that in determining whether or not a contempt is serious 
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however, where the line would be drawn in determining just how lengthy 
a sentence would have to be in order for it to be considered' "serious" 
for jury trial purposes.57 In Baldwin, the petitioner, whose request for a 
jury trial had been denied, was convicted in aNew York state court of 
"jostling" and was sentenced to imprisonment for one year, the maximum 
penalty under the New York statute which created the offense. The Court 
there held that no offense can be deemed "petty" for purposes of the 
right to trial by jury where imprisonment for more than six months is 
authorized. 58 As applied to contempt cases in whkh no maximum penalty 
has been fixed by the legislature, the rule now seems to be that where 
the penalty actually imposed exceeds six months imprisonment, it is 
"serious" and a jury trial is constitutionally required. 
II. THE PETTy-SERIOUS DISTINCTION 
With the Court's abandonment in Bloom of the position it had tradi-
tionally taken in the area of contempt, a new and important constitu-
tional rule of law has developed. In both state and federal courts today, 
criminal contempts must be treated as ordinary "crimes" for the purposes 
of the right to trial by jury. In jurisdictions in which there is no limit 
on the punishment which can be imposed for contempt,59 the penalty 
actually imposed is considered the best evidence of the seriousness of 
for purposes of the right to trial by jury, the "principal inquiry ... relates to 
the character and gravity of the offense itself." Id. at 390. They reasoned that 
contempts should be treated like other crimes for jury trial purposes and that 
since the courts had traditionally looked to the nature of the offense to determine 
whether or not other crimes were serious, they should use this same approach 
in the contempt area. They also felt that even where the contemptuous conduct 
could not be considered serious in nature, it could still be classified as a serious 
offense for jury trial purposes where punishable by imprisonment for greater 
than six months. They considered the maximum authorized penalty a relevant 
factor since it "sheds light on the seriousness with which the community and 
the legislature regard the offense." Id. at 390-91. Since reference to the sentence 
actually imposed does not serve this purpose however, Justices Black and Douglas 
regarded this "after the fact" test as "constitutionally irrelevant." They went on 
to add that where the legislature has not differentiated among the several 
different types of contempt, but has lumped them all together under the single 
rubric of "contempt," the serious nature of some con tempts and the harsh sen-
tence often imposed in such cases controll the legal character of all con tempts, 
with the result that none can be considered "petty" for jury trial purposes. 
56 399 U.S. 66 (1970). 
57 In the federal system, "petty" offenses had been defined as those punishable 
by no more than six months in prison and a $500 fine. 18 U.S.C. §I (1970). 
58 Baldwin v. New York, note 56, supra, at 73-74. 
59 The federal statute which today defines the acts and conduct which may 
be punished as contempts in federal courts imposes no limitations on the courts' 
sentencing power. See 18 U.S.C. HOI (1970). See also 18 U.S.C. §402 (1970). 
For a list of state statutes in force at the time of the Bloom decision which 
imposed no limit on the punishment a judge could impose for criminal contempt, 
see Note, 20 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 481, 487 n.31 (1969). 
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the offense. Moreover, the rule applies to both direct and indirect con-
tempts.60 As to civil contempts and petty criminal contempts, however, 
the rule is preserved that a right to jury trial is not constitutionally re-
quired.61 
The Court in Bloom seems to have reasoned that to determine "serious-
ness" for purposes of the right to trial by jury, a court should look 
to the legislature's view on the matter as indicated by the maximum 
statutory penalty it has authorized for the particular offense. Where no 
maximum penalty is provided, however, the legislature has not spoken 
on the subject, and hence it cannot be determined whether it considered 
the offense serious or petty. In such a situation the best evidence of the 
seriousness of the offense is the penalty actually imposed. In so holding 
the Court refused to adopt the position taken by Justices Douglas and 
Black in Cheff v. Schnackenberg62 that in any case where no maximum 
penalty has been established for contempt, a jury trial should always be 
available because the penalty imposed could exceed six months imprison-
ment.63 The Court's disinclination to apply this rationale is understand-
able since under Black's and Douglas's reasoning a jury trial would be 
required in all contempt cases in jurisdictions having no maximum sta-
tutory penalties for contempt no matter how trivial the offense actually 
committed, and no matter how unlikely a sentence in excess of six 
months imprisonment might be. 
lt is not so clear, however, why the Court made no reference to the 
"nature of the offense" test, long ago established by the Supreme Court, 
to determine whether a particular offense is "serious" or "petty." In 
1888, when the question first arose whether the Sixth Amendment guar-
antee of right to trial by jury extended to all criminal cases, the Court 
developed the petty-serious distinction, holding that only in serious cases 
was there a right to jury trial.64 It found that conspiracy, the particular 
crime for which the petitioner had been prosecuted, was a serious offense. 
The Court reasoned that conspiracy had a grave character which affected 
the public at large. The Court followed this approach until 1937, looking 
in each case to the "nature" or "character" of an offense to determine 
its seriousness.65 In 1937, the Court, in District of Columbia v. Clawans,66 
introduced a new element to be used in determining whether a defendant 
was entitled to a jury trial. The Court held that regardless of the nature 
60 391 U.S. at 210. 
61 Id. at 209. 
62 384 U.S. 373, 384 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
63 "Until' the time when petty criminal contempts are properly defined and 
isolated from other species of contempts, I see no escape from the conclusion 
that punishment for all manner of criminal con tempts can constitutionally be 
imposed only after a trial by jury." Id. at 393. 
64 Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888). 
65 See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63, 72-73 (1930); Schick 
v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 67-68 (1904). 
66 300 U.S. 617 (1937). 
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of the offense, where the penalty which might be imposed is severe, the 
offense should be considered serious for purposes of the right to trial by 
jury.67 The Court's purpose in Clawans was to enlarge the area in which 
criminal offenses would be subject to the constitutional jury trial re-
quirement, and not to replace the "nature of the offense" test as a viable 
standard for characterizing an offense as either serious or petty. Recog-
nizing that where an offense is serious in nature a jury trial is required, 
the Court went on to add that even where the offense was not of a grave 
character, where a severe penalty was authorized by statute the defendant 
was entitled to a jury trial.68 A recent Supreme Court case indicates 
that the "nature of the offense" test is still a viable useful tool for 
determining the seriousness of an offense.69 If so, and if the Bloom Court 
was serious when it said that "criminal contempt is a crime in every 
fundamental respect"70 and that it should be treated like other crimes 
for purposes of the right to trial by jury, then that Court was remiss in 
failing to apply this test to the case before it, or at least, in failing to 
recognize that the "nature of the offense" standard could quite profitably 
be applied to criminal contempt cases. If the Court had taken such an 
approach, problems which have arisen in subsequent years due to the 
Court's formulation of the "penalty actually imposed" test could have 
been greatly reduced. 
The problem with the Court's adoption in Bloom of the "penalty 
actually imposed" standard is that this test is only useful to an appellate 
court, which usually has the sentence before it when reviewing a case.71 
It provides no guidelines to trial courts which must now guess, before 
the trial begins, at the penalty, if any, which might ultimately be im-
posed.72 There is no assurance that the judge will guess correctly and 
67 Id. at 625. 
68 "[T]his C'Ourt has refused t'O foreclose considerati'On 'Of the severity of the 
penalty as an el'ement t'O be c'Onsidered in determining whether a statutory 'Offense, 
in 'Other respects trivial and not a crime at c'Omm'On law, must be deemed S'O 
serious as to be c'Omparable with common law crimes, and thus t'O entitle the 
accused t'O the benefit 'Of a jury trial prescribed by the Constituti'On." Id. See 
als'O Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 67-68 (1904). 
69 Duncan v. L'Ouisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). "Crimes carrying possible 
penalties up t'O six m'Onths d'O n'Ot require a jury trial if they otherwise qualify as 
petty offenses .... " (Emphasis added). 
70 391 U.S. at 201. 
71 See Davis, The Contempt Power: The Barnett Dictum Has Matured in 
Bloom; But is the Hybrid Viable? 11 Ariz. L. Rev. 501, 522 (1969). 
72 "[T]'O decide whether t'O pr'Offer a jury trial, the judge must n'Ow l'Ook ahead 
t'O the sentence, which itself depends 'On the precise facts the trial is t'O reveal." 
Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 382 (1966) (Harlan, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). See als'O C'Omment, Invoking Criminal Contempt 
Pr'Ocedures-Use 'Or Abuse? United States v. Dellinger-The "Chicag'O Seven" 
C'Ontempts [hereinafter cited as Comments, The "Chicago Seven" Contempts], 69 
U. Mich. L. Rev. 1549, 1554 n,42 (1971); N'Ote, The P'Ower 'Of the Judge t'O 
C'Ommand Order in the C'Ourtroom: The Opti'Ons 'Of IlIin'Ois v. Allen [hereinafter 
cited as Note, Illinois v. Allen], 65 Nw. L. Rev. 671, 687 (1970); N'Ote, C'On-
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this is especially true of indirect contempt cases in which he will have 
no knowledge, before the commencement of trial, of certain relevant 
facts bearing not only on the guilt or innocence of the defendant, but 
also on matters in extenuation or mitigation of the offense. A judge who 
miscalculates will find himself in the position either of having empanelled 
a jury unnecessarily in a case where the sentence imposed is less than 
six months, or of having to hold a new trial when, in a non-jury situation, 
it develops that a sentence greater than six months is warranted. The 
resultant wastefulness needs no comment. Moreover, a judge who wishes 
to avoid retrial before a jury is encouraged to limit the sentence he im-
poses to six months imprisonment regardless of the merits of a given 
case. He may wish to avoid the waste and expense of a time-consuming 
retrial, or he may fear that a retrial before a jury will lead to acquittal 
of the defendant.73 Whatever the reason, such a limitation provides 
a defendant whose conduct merits punishment in excess of six months 
imprisonment with an unjustified benefit. Moreover, the argument on 
which it is based reflects an attitude of substantial disrespect for the 
institution of trial by jury.74 Alternatively, judges who believe that a 
punishment in excess of six months imprisonment is warranted, but who 
are unwilling to have the case retried to a jury, will be encouraged to 
find in the defendant's conduct more than one contempt75 and impose 
consecutive penalties for each one. As one commentator has described 
this practice, "[T]he alert judge would simply limit his contempt sentences 
to six months and perhaps string together several sentences of six months 
in an attempt to avoid the jury trial requirement."76 
The problems presented by the "penalty actually imposed" standard 
now used in contempt of court cases can be resolved to a great extent 
by resort to well-established rules traditionally employed by the Court 
in determining whether ordinary crimes are serious or petty for jury 
trial purposes. For instance, while it may not be desirable to hold that 
in jurisdictions having no limits on punishment for contempt, a jury 
stitutional Law: A New Right to Jury Trial in State Criminal Contempt Cases 
[hereinafter cited as A New Right to Jury Trial], 21 U. Fla. L. Rev. 267, 270 
(1969). 
73 See Note, Illinois v. Allen, note 72, supra, at 687. 
74 In Green v. United States, Justice Black remarked that "[n]othing concrete 
is ever offered to support the innuendo that juries will not convict the same 
proportion of those guilty of contempt as would judges." 356 U.S. at 214 (dis-
senting opinion). 
75 This practice was employed in the foIlowing cases, but in each one the 
court on appeal found that only one contempt had been committed: Yates v. 
United States, 355 U.S. 66 (1957); Baker v. Eisenstadt, 456 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 
1972); United States v. Orman, 207 F.2d 148 (3d Cir. 1953); United States v. 
Costello, 198 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1952); United States v. Yukio Abe, 95 F. Supp. 
991 (D. Hawaii 1950); People v. Riela, 7 N.Y.2d 571, 200 N.Y.S.2d 43, 166 
N.E.2d 840 (1960). 
76 Comment, The "Chicago Seven" Contempts, note 72, supra, at 1555 n.42. 
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trial should be required in all cases since the ma~imum potential penalty 
exceeds six months imprisonment, a test which looks to the maximum 
punishment authorized can, in certain instances, be used to great ad-
vantage. Where, for example, the contempt is also a violation of a 
criminal statute, and where, furthermore, the statute provides a maximum 
penalty in excess of six months imprisonment, the offense can, and should, 
be considered "serious" for purposes of trial by jury. In such instances 
the character and nature of the offense is not changed by the fortuitous 
circumstance that it is punished as a contempt and not as a violation of 
a criminal statute. In either case the conduct is the same.77 Moreover, 
where the legislature has imposed no limits on the punishment for con-
tempt, but where it has made the same conduct a statutory crime punish-
able by more than six months imprisonment, it cannot be said that the 
legislature has failed to express a judgment as to the seriousness of the 
particular offense. Consequently, under the Court's apparent reasoning 
in Bloom that an offense must be considered serious where the legislature 
has expressed its belief that a penalty in excess of six months imprison-
ment is justified, the offense should be triable to a jury regardless of 
how it is punished. 
The courts should also look to the "nature of the offense" to determine 
the seriousness of a contempt just as they do in cases involving other 
crimes. Under this standard, conduct of a gmve character is "serious" 
for jury trial purposes.78 In this regard, the courts often ask whether 
the conduct was indictable at common law79 or whether it is today in-
77 This approach has been taken by the federal government as reflected in 18 
U.S.C. §§402, 3691 (1970). Section 402 provides that except in cases of "con-
tempts committed in disobedience of any lawful writ, process, order, rule, 
decree, or command entered in any suit or action brought or prosecuted in the 
name of, or on behalf of, the United States ... ", a jury trial is required in 
criminal contempt proceedings where the act in question constitutes a separate 
criminal offense under either state or federal law. 
In Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165 (1958), the contempt was the failure 
of petitioners to surrender themselves to federal authorities at the time prescribed 
by order of the court. This same conduct also violated a federal bail-jumping 
statute, 18 U.S.C. §3146, for which a maximum penalty of three years imprison-
ment could be imposed and for which the right to trial by jury was guaranteed. 
The Court there upheld the contempt convictions rendered without trial' by 
jury, and the resulting sentences of three years imprisonment. Justice Black had 
this to say: "After surrendering the defendants were charged with fleeing from 
justice, convicted, and given lengthy prison sentences designed to punish them 
for their flight. Identical flight has now been made a statutory crime by the 
Congress with severe penalties. How can it possibly be any more of a crime to be 
convicted of disobeying a statute and sent to jail for three years than to be found 
guilty of violating a judicial decree forbidding precisely the same conduct and 
imprisoned for the same term?" Id. at 202 (dissenting opinion). 
78 "Whether a given offense is to be classed as a crime, so as to require a 
jury trial, or as a petty offense, triable summaril'y without a jury, depends 
primarily upon the nature of the offense." (Emphasis added). District of Columbia 
v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63, 73 (1930). 
79 See, e.g., Chelf v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 390 (1966) (Douglas, J., 
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dictable as a felony.80 Such an offense is usually malum in se81 and not 
merely malum prohibitum, and convicting and sentencing one for this 
type of conduct-even for a period of time less than six months-will 
ordinarily stigmatize an individual in the eyes of the community.82 The 
resulting damage to the defendant's reputation may be irreparable and 
this, surely, is indicative of a "serious" offense. Where the particular 
offense has not been made a felony, but where it is, nevertheless, con-
sidered "an act of . . . obvious depravity,"83 or one whose quality is 
morally offensive,84 it should likewise be considered serious in nature and 
the right to jury trial should be recognized. 
By awarding the defendant a jury trial in contempt cases in which 
the offense is serious in nature and/or in cases in which the particular 
act constituting the contempt is also punishable as a statutory crime by 
more than six months imprisonment, courts will avoid much of the 
uncertainty and guesswork inherent in a standard which looks solely to 
the penalty actually imposed to determine whether a contempt is serious 
for jury trial purposes. A problem will still remain in cases in which 
the contempt is neither serious in nature, nor punishable as an ordinary 
crime by more than six months imprisonment. In most such cases, how-
ever, the courts will have no desire to confine the defendant for a period 
greater than six months. In the few such cases in which the sentence 
does exceed six months, the penalty imposed rule could be retained. These 
cases would be so infrequent that application of the rule would cease 
to portend the serious consequences of judicial inefficiency presently 
threatened by the hroader application contemplated in Bloom v. Illinois. 
dissenting); District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617,625 (1937); District 
of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63, 73 (1930). 
80 See, e.g., Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 549 (1888). See also, Note, Illinois 
v. Allen, note 72, supra, at 687. 
81 See Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 390 (1966) (Douglas, J., dis-
senting); District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63, 73 (1930); Note, Constitu-
tional Law-Right to Trial by Jury-Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970), 
5 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 269, 272 (1970). 
For an extreme example of a contempt case in which the defendants were 
tried without a jury and in which the offense itself was very grave in character 
(malum in se), see United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563 (1906). There, pending 
appellate review of a criminal conviction of a Negro for rape of a white woman 
in Tennessee, a mob lynched the convict. The federal court had ordered his safe 
detention pending appeal. The Court, evidencing the ultimate sensitivity of its 
honor, decided that the lynching was done "with intent to show contempt for 
the order of this court". Id. at 572. The Court then ordered that the defendants 
be tried for the offense, but it made no provision for trial by jury. 
82 The "stigma" attaching to one convicted of committing an offense is con-
sidered an important factor in determining the seriousness of the offense. See 
Cheff v. Schna.ckenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 390 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting); 
Note, The "ChIcago Seven" Contempts, note 72, supra, at 1562. 
83 District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63, 73 (1930). 
84 See District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 625 (1937). 
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III. MULTIPLE OFFENSES AND MULTIPLE PUNISHMENTS 
The constitutional guarantee of trial by jury in criminal contempt 
cases as enunciated in Bloom does not extend to cases in which an 
offense is punished by less than six months imprisonment. The question 
arises whether a defendant found guilty of several different contempts 
can receive punishment of up to six months imprisonment for each one, 
sentences to run consecutively, without the right to trial by jury. As yet 
no statute or decision, either state or federal, expressly denies a trial 
court, acting without a jury, the power to aggregate sentences that in-
dividually do not exceed the six month limit in Bloom and Baldwin.85 
Some cases have expressly held that such a practice is constitutionally 
permissible.86 Therefore, it is particularly important to ascertain whether 
there really are several distinct offenses or in fact only one. Among the 
considerations requiring this determination is the guarantee against 
double jeopardy87 provided in the Fifth Amendment and made applicable 
to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment,88 under which a de-
fendant may not receive multiple punishment for the same offense.89 
This applies in all cases regardless of the length of the sentence imposed. 
There are hasically two areas in which dOUible jeopardy and right to 
trial by jury problems arise in regard to multiple punishments in con-
tempt cases. One set of cases deals with refusals to testify and the other 
concerns in-court disturbances. Each grouping presents different prob-
lems and in each a different set of rules determines the precise number 
of contempts committed. 
A. REFUSALS TO TESTIFY 
Where the defendant's contemptuous conduct consists of refusals to 
answer more than one question, either in a judicial proceeding or at a 
Congressional or other legislative hearing, the courts have used two 
85 See Comment, The ttChicago Seven" Contempts, note 72, supra, at 1560. 
86 See, e.g., State v. Owens, 54 N.J. 153, 163, 254 A.2d 97, 102 (1969) ("[A] 
jury trial may not be demanded where the offenses are all petty even though the 
total of the authorized sentences exceeds what would be permissible without a 
jury trial in the case of a single offense."); State v. James, 76 N.M. 416, 415 
P.2d 543 (1966); Scott v. District of Columbia, 122 A.2d 579 (D.C. Mun. Ct. 
App. 1956); Savage v. District of Columbia, 54 A.2d 562 (D.C. Mun. Ct. 
App. 1947). 
87 The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States states in 
relevant part: "nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice 
put in jeopardy of life or limb. . . ." 
88 Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). 
89 "The argument seems to us irresistible, and we do not doubt that the 
Constitution was designed as much to prevent the criminal from being twice 
punished for the same offense as from being twice tried for it." (Emphasis added). 
Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. 163, 173 (1873). See also North Carolina v. Pearce, 
395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969); United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304, 308 (1931); 
Baker v. Eisenstadt, 456 F.2d 382, 389 n.6 (1st Cir. 1972); United States v. 
Adams, 62 F.2d 210, 212 (6th Cir. 1966). 
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different approaches to detenmne the number of separate offenses com-
mitted. One asks whether the defendant has initially "carved out an 
area of refusal" to give testimony on a particular matter.90 If he has, 
then only one offense of contempt is cognizable-the original refusal 
either to give any testimony or to testify in a given area. All subsequent 
refusals to answer questions on the particular subject under inquiry, or 
in the particular area "carved out" by the defendant, partake of the 
original contempt and do not constitute separate offenses. The rationale 
underlying this approach is that the affront to the court's authority is 
total and complete at the very outset of questioning when the defendant 
refuses to give any testimony or to testify in the particular area.91 All 
later refusals are merely reiterations by the defendant of his intention 
to adhere to his earlier statement. 
The other approach looks to the nature of the questions which the 
defendant has refused to answer to determine whether they are all de-
signed to elicit a single fact or relate to a "single subject of inquiry."92 
If so, again there is only one contempt no matter how many questions 
have been asked.93 
It is usually a fairly easy fact question whether the defendant has 
successfully carved out an area of refusal. Thus in United States v. Cos-
tello,94 the defendant, who had been called to testify before a Senate 
Committee on organized crime, flatly refused at the outset of his in-
terrogation to give any testimony on the grounds that he was suffering 
from laryngitis. The Committee rejected the excuse and asked him 
several questions, all of which he refused to answer. The district court 
convicted the defendant of ten separate con tempts ; but the court of 
appeals reversed, holding that only one contempt was committed, namely, 
the original refusal to answer any questions. In so holding, the court 
said: 
But when the defendant made his position clear, the Committee 
could not multiply the contempt, and the punishment, by continuing 
to ask him questions each time eliciting the same answer: his refusal 
90 See generally Yates v. United States, 355 U.S. 66 (1957); Baker v. Eisen-
stadt, 456 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1972); United States v. Costello, 198 F.2d 200 
(2d Cir. 1952); People v. RieIa, 7 N.Y.2d 571, 200 N.Y.S.2d 43, 166 N.E.2d 
840 (1960); People v. Saperstein, 2 N.Y.2d 210, 159 N.Y.S.2d 160, 140 N.E.2d 
252 (1957); Note, Illinois v. Allen, note 72, supra. 
91 See, e.g., Baker, note 90, supra, at 391; Costell'o, note 82, supra, at 204. 
92 See Yates, note 90, supra; Baker, note 90, supra; Costello, note 90, supra; 
United States v. Orman, 207 F.2d 148 (3d Cir. 1953); United States v. Emspak, 
95 F. Supp. 1010 (D.D.C. 1951); United States v. Yukio Abe, 95 F. Supp. 991 
(D. Hawaii 1950); Riela, note 90, supra. 
93 While it is usually the case that where there is only one subject of inquiry, 
there has also been either an initial refusal to give any testimony or a "carving 
out" of an area of refusal, and vice versa, this need not be so for the court 
to find but one contempt. Where either test is met there is only one offense. See 
generally cases in notes 90 and 92. 
94 Note 90, supra. 
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to give any testimony. In other words, the contempt was total when 
he stated that he would not testify, and the refusals thereafter to 
answer specific questions can not be considered as anything more 
than expressions of his intention to adhere to his earlier statement 
and as such were not separately punishable.95 
The Supreme Court reached the same result on similar facts in Yates v. 
United States. 96 In Yates, however, the defendant, unlike Costello, did 
not initially refuse to give any testimony. Nevertheless, when questioned 
about ,the Communist Party membership of certain of her friends and 
acquaintances, she refused to answer, saying: "However many times 
I am asked and in however many forms, to identify a person as a 
communist, I can't bring myself to do it .... "97 The prosecution then 
asked the defendant eleven questions concerning her knowledge of such 
affiliations, all of which she refused to answer. She was found guilty of 
eleven different contempts and the court of appeals affirmed. The Su-
preme Court reversed, holding that the defendant had successfully 
delineated and defined the particular area in which she intended to re-
main silent and that her refusal to answer any questions in that area 
constituted a single contempt: 
The Government admits, pursuant to the holding of United States 
v. Costello . .. t:hat only one contempt would result if Mrs. Yates 
had flatly refused on June 26 to answer any questions and had main-
tained such a position. We deem ita fortiori true that where a 
witness draws the lines of refusal in less sweeping fashion by declining 
to answer questions within a generally defined area of interrogation, 
the prosecutor cannot multiply contempts by further questions within 
that area.98 
Similarly, in People v. Riela,99 the New York Court of Appeals found 
that when the defendant, erroneously relying on a claimed privilege 
against self-incrimination, initially refused to answer any questions con-
cerning the so-called "Appalachian Meeting," his subsequent refusal to 
answer 17 questions relating to that meeting constituted only one con-
tempt and not 17 con tempts as the trial court had found. The same 
court reached a different result, however, in People v. Saperstein. 100 
There, the defendant was questioned as to the identity of the participants 
95 Id. at 204. 
96 355 U.S. 66 (1957). 
97 Id. at 68. 
98 Id. at 73. In addressing itself to the policy considerations surrounding its 
decision, the Court went on to add: "The policy of the law must be to encourage 
testimony; a witness willing to testify freely as to all areas of investigation but 
one, should not be subject to more numerous charges of contempt than a witness 
unwilling to give any testimony at all." Id. 
99 Note 90, supra. 
100 Id. 
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of five wire-tapped telephone conversations to which he had been a party. 
Although his other testimony had been for the most part freely given, 
he replied in each of these instances that he was uncertain as to who 
the other participants were or that he couldn't remember. The trial 
court found that he was lying and convicted him of five separate con-
tempts. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed. Unlike Riela, de-
fendant Saperstein had failed to carve out an area of refusal, and it 
was for this reason that he could not claim that his conduct constituted 
only one contempt. In distinguishing the two cases, the court in Riela 
observed that: 
Each of the contempts [in Saperstein] was [not] based ... upon a 
refusal grounded on any claim of privilege. . . . These refusals came 
at different points during the course of testimony which was other-
wise freely given, and each refusal was unrelated to every other one. 
Under such circumstances, there could be no assurance, after the 
witness had refused to answer the question with respect to the first 
phone call, that he would likewise refuse to answer the later questions 
about the other conversations. It was not possible in Saperstein, 
as it was here, to predict or foresee the pattern of refusal which 
necessarily attends the assertion of a claim of privilege,lOI 
Riela and Saperstein indicate that the test which has developed in this 
area is whether or not adequate notice has been given to the prosecutor 
that the defendant does not intend to testify on the particular subject 
or within the particular area of inquiry. This in turn will determine 
whether he is conducting a good-faith interrogation or whether, having 
ascertained that the defendant does not intend to answer his questions, 
he is merely trying to multiply offense.102 Relevant to this inquiry is 
the reason for the defendant's refusal to testify. Where, for instance, he 
refuses to answer questions due to a claimed privilege against self-
incrimination, it is likely that he will decline to respond to further 
questioning within the same general area. 103 This is especially true in 
101 7 N.Y.2d at 578, 200 N.Y.S. 2d at 47, 166 N.E.2d at 843-44. 
102 In further distinguishing the fact situation in its own case from that pre-
sented in Saperstein, the court in Riela commented as follows: "In the present 
case, the District Attorney necessarily knew ahead of time, that the claim of 
privilege first asserted would be repeated, while in Saperstein the prosecutor had 
to continue questioning to find the limits of the defendant's refusal to answer. In 
Saperstein, in other words, the District Attorney was engaged in bona fide interro-
gation, in the sense that he could reasonably have supposed that the witness 
would answer each of the questions asked, while here the District Attorney re-
peated 17 questions knowing full well' from Riela's response to his first query 
that he would not answer any of them." 7 N.Y.2d at 578, 200 N.Y.S.2d at 47, 
166 N.E.2d at 844. See also Yates, note 82, supra, at 73; Baker, note 90, supra, 
at 390 ("Courts are also wary lest prosecutors, by their sheer ingenuity in con-
ceiving and stamina in asking multiple questions calling for slightly different 
answers, be able to proliferate offenses."). 
103 See Baker, note 90, supra, at 391-92; Riela, note 90, supra, at 577, 200 
N.Y.S.2d at 46, 166 N.E.2d at 843. 
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jurisdictions which deem anyone answer in the chain of questioning to 
be a waiver of the privilege as to all sU!bsequent questions. 104 Thus the 
defendant must claim his privilege at the outset and, in order to retain 
it, must continue to assert it throughout the entire questioning. He cannot 
pick and choose which questions to answer,l°5 
Although the "carving out an area of refusal" approach has, in most 
cases, the salutary effect of limiting the number of con tempts which a 
court can impose on an individual who refuses to testify, application 
of this standard can, in certain instances, lead to undesirable results. 
This is so in cases like Saperstein where the defendant, who wishes for 
the most part to cooperate with the court, fails initially to carve out an 
area of refusal and answers most, but not all, of the court's questions. 
The defendant here can, conceivably, be charged with several contempts 
and not just one. This is in marked contrast to the case presented by the 
individual who refuses at the outset to answer any questions. Such an 
individual is much less cooperative with the court than the defendant 
in the first case, and therefore, arguably, more culpable. Yet his conduct 
is limited to one contempt. The anomalous results reached by the courts 
in these two different situations are most inequitable. 
Where the defendant has not initially carved out an area of refusal, 
his failure to answer several questions will still be considered only one 
contempt where those questions pertain to but a "single subject of in-
quiry."I06 This particular standard can be easily applied, however, only 
104 See Reila, note 90, supra, at 577, 200 N.Y.S.2d at 46, 166 N.E.2d at 843; 
Baker, note 90, supra, at 393. The purpose for a waiver rule was described in 
Baker: "The thought underlying the doctrine of waiver seems to be that when 
incriminating responses have already been made, the value to a witness of sup-
pressing further incriminating answers may not be so great as to outweigh the 
prejudice to another involved person if the testimony is allowed to remain in its 
witness-selected posture, quite possibly one-sided and distorted." 456 F.2d at 393. 
105 If every refusal to answer were considered a separate offense, in jurisdictions 
with such a waiver rule a witness would face the dilemma of either incurring 
multipl'e penalties for continued refusals to answer or of waiving his privilege 
by trying to keep his con tempts at a minimum. Baker, note 90, supra, at 394. At 
the very least this would have a chilling effect on the exercise of the privilege 
against self-incrimination and should, therefore, be avoided. 
106 See cases in note 92. 
In applying the "single subject of inquiry" test, the courts in contempt cases 
concerning refusals to testify, have declined to follow the "same evidence" standard 
originally formulated in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). There 
the Court announced: "[T] he test to be applied to determine whether there are 
two offenses or only one, is whether each [chargeJ requires proof of a fact which 
the other does not." Id. at 304. Since each refusal to answer is a separate incident 
susceptible to proof by different facts, under the Blockburger rule each refusal 
would constitute a separate, different offense. In rejecting this standard in con-
tempt cases in this area, the court in Riela commented that "the circumstance 
that no two questions could have been answered by a single response is beside 
the point. What is of significance is that . . . the questions, different though they 
were from one another, all related to ... one subject." 7 N.Y.2d at 576, 200 
N.Y.S.2d at 46, 166 N.E.2d at 842-43. Other cases have held that a Blockburger 
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in a relatively small number of cases in which the questions asked, though 
requiring slightly different answers, seek to elicit but a single fact or 
only one item of information. In United States v. Orman,107 for example, 
the defendant was convicted in the district court of two separate con-
tempts for refusal to answer two different questions, each of which sought 
to determine from whom the defendant had borrowed $25,000. The 
court of appeals reversed, finding 'but one contempt and holding that 
"where separate questions seek to establish but a single fact, or relate 
to but a single subject of inquiry, only one penalty for contempt may be 
imposed."l08 
In other cases, however, in which different but additionally relevant 
and interconnected facts are sought to be established, it is often difficult, 
if not impossible, to determine whether all the questions constitute a 
single subject of inquiry. A case in point is the aforementioned Saper-
stein. In handling the multiple contempt issue, the New York Court of 
Appeals stated: "As to appellant's assertion that he was guilty of one 
contempt only, not five contempts, it is a sufficient answer that his con-
tumacious conduct had to do with five separate telephone talks."109 The 
court in Saperstein categorized the subjects of inquiry in terms of tele-
phone conversations. However, all of these conversations related to the 
defendant's business dealings, which were the primary subject of the 
grand jury's investigation. The court could have as easily and as ration-
ally found only one subject of inquiry, namely, the defendant's business 
activities in the insurance area; and since the questions concerning the 
five different telephone conversations all pertained to this single subject 
of inquiry, it could have held that the several refusals to answer con-
stituted only one contempt. The decision could perhaps be rationalized 
on the ground that the grand jury was really interested in not only 
thQ defendant's business dealings, but also in the activities of the five 
other people with whom the defendant spoke on the phone; that these 
five people represented five separate subject matters; and that, therefore, 
five different con tempts were made out. If this is true, however, then 
the finding of only one subject of inquiry in Riela is wrong, since in 
that case the grand jury was obviously interested not only in the de-
rationale, although useful and oftentimes necessary in determining how many 
separate counts should be included in an indictment [one count for each re-
fusaIl, could not be used to multiply offenses. See Baker, note 90, supra, at 389-
90; Orman, note 92, supra, at 160; Emspak, note 92, supra, at 1014-15; Yukio 
Abe, note 92, supra, at 992. 
107 Note 92, supra. 
108 Orman, note 92, supra, at 160. See also Fawick Airftex Co. v. United 
Electrical' Workers, 56 Ohio L. Abs. 419, 92 N.E.2d 431 (1950), in which the 
court held that the defendant's refusal to answer three different questions con-
cerning his alleged membership in the Communist Party constituted only one 
contempt. The court explained that "[iln fact the entire inquiry was directed 
toward the establishment of but one fact." Id. at 426, 92 N.E.2d at 436. 
109 2 N.Y.2d at 219, 159 N.Y.S.2d at 167, 140 N.E.2d at 257. 
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fendant's connection with the "Appalachian Meeting," but also in the 
presence and activities of several individuals who also attended that 
meeting.110 Using a Saperstein rationale, the court in Riela could have 
concluded that the number of different con tempts was to be determined 
by the number of individuals who were the subject of the prosecutor's 
questions which Riela refused to answer. The problem in this area was 
well described in Baker v. Eisenstadt: 111 
While such a conclusory formulation as "single subject" or "single 
line of inquiry", or "same subject matter" may be sufficient to de-
scribe the disposition of cases in which a prosecutor has simply 
reframed in various forms a question addressed to whether the wit-
ness was a Communist, it is less helpful when different but addition-
ally relevant and interconnected facts are sought to be elicited. The 
concept of a "single subject" is frustratingly open-ended, there being 
infinite ways of categorizing information in terms of time, place, 
incident, transaction, people, etc. Moreover, the use of such phrases 
as "single subject" as the basis for defining a contumacious refusal 
to testify involves the invocation of a wooden rubric devoid of any 
relation to policy.ll2 
In employing the "carving out an area of refusal" approach, the 
courts often reach unjust results. Under this standard an uncooperative 
defendant who initially refuses to give any testimony can be found guilty 
of only one contempt; the defendant who wishes to help the court, how-
ever, and who for this reason fails to carve out an area of refusal, can 
be cited for several different contempts, the exact number depending on 
the number of questions he has declined to answer. It merely compounds 
the problem to say that since this is so, an intelligent defendant will 
automatically refuse at the outset to answer any questions. Nor will the 
inequities always he eradicated by giving the defendant an additional 
chance under the "single subject of inquiry" test, to show that his con-
duct constitutes only one contempt. This is unfortunately so since there 
are numerous ways of categorizing contempts as the Court in Baker aptly 
noted. The particular categorization used in any given case, which in 
turn will determine the number of separate offenses with which the 
defendant can be charged, is subject only to the whim of the court. 
Moreover, the lack of definite guidelines in this area prevents witnesses 
from determining in advance how certain contemplated action will be 
treated by the courts. Such uncertainty in the criminal law, it can be 
110 Sixty individuals were reputed to have been present at the Appalachin 
Meeting. See Riela, note 90, supra, at 577, 200 N.Y.S.2d at 46, 166 N.E.2d at 
843. The court did reach the correct result in Riela, however, regardless of how 
many subjects of inquiry it can be said there were, since the defendant had suc-
cessfu11y "carved out" his area of refusal at the very outset of his questioning. 
111 Note 90, supra. 
112 Id. at 390-91. 
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argued, does not comport with the requirements of due process,ll3 and 
at the very least is an undesirable by-product of present contempt law. 
It would seem then that the approach used by courts today to deter-
mine the number of con tempts involved in refusals to answer more than 
one question, namely whether the defendant has "carved out an area 
of refusal" and/or whether the unanswered questions pertain to a 
"single subject of inquiry," is most unsatisfactory. A better way of deal-
ing with this problem, perhaps, would be to treat a refusal or refusals 
to answer anyone question or any number of questions in a single 
judicial proceeding as only one contempt. The single contempt would be 
the defendant's obstruction of the administration of justice in the judicial 
proceeding in which he is called to testify. In each instance the particular 
facts of the case would determine whether the defendant's conduct con-
stitutes a serious or a petty offense. Where the facts indicate that the 
affront to the court is minor, the offense could be considered petty and 
the court, acting without a jury, could impose a sentence appropriate 
for petty crimes in general. Such a case would be presented where the 
defendant for the most part cooperates with the court, but where he 
declines to answer certain questions on the mistaken but good-faith 
belief that he has a constitutional right to remain silent. Where the 
particular facts indicate that the defendant's actions are serious, such 
as where the defendant, without any pretense of reliance on an alleged 
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, refuses to give any 
testimony in a proceeding of great public concern, the court could 
impanel a jury. If the defendant were found guilty the court could then 
impose a sentence in excess of six months imprisonment. Under such a 
system the courts could make the punishment fit the crime wtihout re-
sorting to the artificial distinctions inherent in the present laws. 
B. IN-COURT DISTURBANCES 
In Illinois v. Allen114 the Supreme Court held that there are at least 
three constitutionally permissible methods for dealing with disruption 
of a trial by an unruly defendant: (1) removal of the defendant from 
the courtroom until he promises to behave properly, (2) physical restraint 
and (3) citation of the defendant for contempt of court. Where the 
trial court judge chooses the contempt approach and the defendant is 
responsible for disrupting the trial on several different occasions during 
the course of the proceedings, the question is raised whether each inci-
dent of disturbance is a separate contempt, distinct and independent 
from all the others, or whether they are all but a part of one larger 
contempt, namely, the disruption of the trial proceedings. Until now 
the courts which have been faced with this problem have concluded 
that each disturbance constitutes a separate offense and that therefore, 
113 See, e.g., Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948). 
114 397 U.S. 337 (1970). 
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they may all be punished either cumulatively, concurrently, or in a 
manner which reflects a combination of these approaches.ll5 Further, 
where consecutive penalties are imposed the courts have held that so 
long as each offense is punished by imprisonment for less than six 
months a jury trial is not constitutionally required no matter how long 
the aggregate sentence imposed.116 The only limitation on the court's 
power seems to be that imposed by the Eighth Amendment prohibition 
against cruel and unusual punishment. ll7 In this regard, an aggregate 
sentence could be attacked as cruel and unusual if it were disproportion-
ate to the offenses committed.118 Such attacks, however, are rarely suc-
cessful,119 and as yet no sentence for contempt of court has been set 
aside on Eighth Amendment grounds. 
In concluding that different acts of disruption during the same pro-
ceedings constitute different contempts, punishable cumulatively, the 
courts, though not expressly so stating, rely on the traditional "same 
evidence" test propounded by the Court in Blockburger v. United States. 12O 
There the Court held that "[t]he test to be applied to determine whether 
there are two offenses or only one, is whether each [charge] requires 
proof of a fact which the other does not."121 
In recent years, however, there have been challenges to the propriety 
and constitutionality of treating different disruptive acts as separate 
contempts, and of imposing aggregate sentences in excess of six months 
imprisonment without trial by jury. Where the defendant's acts indicate 
the same type of continual misbehavior, or where the different acts of 
disturbance and disruption are the result of but a single intent or pur-
pose on the defendant's part, such as to show disapproval for the court's 
bias, it can be argued that these different incidents really constitute only 
115 See, e.g., Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971); United States v. 
Dellinger, No. 69 C.R. 18 (N.D. Ill., Feb. 14-15, 1970) (This unreported case 
dealt with contempt proceedings resulting from the "Chicago Seven" conspiracy 
trial). The decisions in this area are few. 
116 In Dellinger, five of the seven defendants, and both their counsel, were 
cited for several different acts of contempt, for which they each received an 
aggregate sentence in excess of six months imprisonment. See Comment, The 
"Chicago Seven" Contempts, note 72, supra, at 1557 n.55 (1971). 
117 The Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides: 
"Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor crueF and 
unusual punishments inflicted." 
118 See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910). 
119 See Note, The Effectiveness of the Eighth Amendment: An Appraisal of 
Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 36 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 846, 861 n.l04 (1961). See 
generally, Goldfarb, The Constitution and Contempt of Court, 61 U. Mich. L. 
Rev. 283, 340-47 (1962). 
120 284 U.S. 299 (1932). 
121 Id. at 304. As we have seen, this standard has been rejected by the courts 
in contempt cases dealing with refusals to testify, in favor of standards formulated 
in terms of "subjects of inquiry" and "areas of refusal." These latter guidelines, 
however, would have no meaning if applied to in-court disturbance cases. 
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one continuing contempt,122 for which a maximum of six months im-
prisonment can be imposed by the court acting without a jury. This 
argument is based on the Court's holding in Yates v. United Statesl23 
that the defendant's eleven separate refusals to answer questions re-
questing her to identify others as communists constituted only one con-
tinuing contempt.124 
It is doubtful, however, whether this argument, and the analogy made 
between in-court disturbances and refusals to testify, will withstand 
scrutiny. For one thing, the Court in Yates found only one "continuing" 
contempt for the sole purpose of showing that the defendant, who had 
initially been cited only for civil contempt, could later be cited for 
criminal contempt as well.125 Furthermore, in those contempt cases deal-
ing with refusals to testify, where the defendant originally carves out an 
area of refusal or initially refuses to give any testimony whatsoever, all 
damage is done at the outset of the questioning. The affront to the court's 
authority is total and complete at that point, and there is no reason at 
any time thereafter to continue that part of the proceeding relating to 
questioning of the defendant on the particular subject of inquiry. Con-
sequently, further questioning in the same area, resulting in further re-
fusals to answer, will bring about no more harm to the court than it 
has already suffered. This is not so where the contempt involves in-court 
disturbances. In these cases the defendant is usually on trial for some 
other crime and the proceedings cannot be terminated, either in whole 
or in part, at the first sign of the defendant's intent to disrupt the pro-
ceedings. Consequently, the first disruptive act does not make the con-
tempt total and complete as does the first unanswered question in the 
refusal to testify cases. The proceedings must continue and the court-
unless it either binds and gags the defendant, or bars him from the court-
room-must suffer each subsequent disruptive act which in tum heaps 
new injury on the court independent of and additional to the injury 
already inflicted by earlier disturbances.126 The analogy can be further 
122 See Comment, The "Chicago Seven" Contempts, note 72, supra, at 1558; 
Note, Illinois v. Allen, note 72, supra, at 689. 
123 355 U.S. 66 (1957). 
124 Id. at 74. 
125 Id. 
126 One author has distinguished the refusal to testify cases and the in-court 
disturbance cases in the following manner: "When the contempt consists of 
exactly the same type of act-refusing to answer a certain type of question-the 
court can guard against a continual threat to its authority by seeing that the 
question is not asked again. But in the [in-court disturbance cases], one cannot 
anticipate what form the defendant's conduct will take and thus cannot prevent 
its recurrence. It is impossibte to predict when and how often the contemnor 
will curse the judge or ridicule his rulings." Note, Illinois v. Allen, note 72, supra 
at 690. 
Perhaps it would be wiser in cases such as that presented by the trial of the 
"Chicago Seven" for the court to resort to the other choices mentioned in 
Illinois v. Allen. The courts have never held, however, that a judge is constitu-
tional1y required to either bind and gag a defendant or have him removed from 
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broken down when it is considered that in cases of refusals to testify the 
antagonistic force is the prosecutor, and not the defendant, whereas in 
the courtroom disturbance cases the defendant is the antagonistic force 
since it is he who makes the voluntary choice to multiply his offenses.l27 
In addition, there is a very strong policy argument which requires that 
each separate disruptive act be treated as a different contempt. Without 
the right to treat each disturbance as a separate offense the court would 
have no power to deter others from committing any but the first con-
temptuous act. Only the first act could be punished and it would then 
offer immunity for all further violations.128 
There should be, however, an outer limit to the aggregate sentence 
which can be imposed for multiple con tempts. Regardless of whether 
separate acts of courtroom disturbance are counted as one contempt or 
several different contempts, the court should not be allowed to impose 
an aggregate sentence in excess of six months imprisonment without first 
granting a jury trial. To do so would thwart the entire purpose of the 
constitutional limitations imposed by the Court in Bloom. The theory 
behind this argument is that if the six-month rule established in Bloom 
is held to be applicable only to each offense, it would not curtail the 
potential abuses of the contempt power at which the Court's decision 
in Bloom was specifically aimed.l29 As one author has suggested: 
If harshness and abuse in the fonn of lengthy contempt sanctions 
are tolerated under the guise that they represent punishment for 
separate offenses, the entire purpose of the constitutional limitations 
imposed by Bloom, Cheff, and Baldwin is frustrated. 130 
As yet no court has favorably responded to this argument. To do so 
would involve a weakening of the courts' summary contempt power in 
an area in which this power has traditionally been considered essential. 
Even Bloom recognized "the need to maintain order and a deliberative 
atmosphere in the courtroom,"131 the Court later adding that "[t]he 
power of a judge to quell disturbance cannot attend upon the impaneling 
of a jury."132 This being so it is at least doubtful that the Court will 
soon be moved to further liberalize the rules relating to jury trial in 
this particular area. 
WILLIAM J. TUCK.ER 
the courtroom, as opposed to citing him for contempt, simply to protect a de-
fendant from his own intentional, albeit foolish, actions. 
127 See Note, Illinois v. Allen, note 72, supra, at 689-90. 
128 See Henderson v. James, 52 Ohio St. 242, 39 N.E. 805 (1895). See also 
Note, Mayberry v. Pennsylvania: Due Process Limitation in Summary Punish-
ments for Contempt of Court, 25 Sw.L.J. 805, 807 (1971); Note, Illinois v. 
Allen, note 72, supra, at 688. 
129 "The court has long recognized the potential for abuse in exercising the 
summary power to imprison for contempt-it is an 'arbitrary' power which is 
<liable to abuse.''' Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 202 (1968). 
130 Comment, The "Chicago Seven" Contempts, note 72, supra, at 1560. 
131 Bloom v. Illinois, note 129, supra, at 210. 
132 Id. 
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STUDENT COMMENT 
§18.8. Statutory prohibition of promotional games in the retail 
fuel industry: Mobil Oil Corp. v. Attorney General) The Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court upheld the constitutionality of Chapter 602 
of the Acts of 19682 which prohibits motor vehicle fuel sellers or dealers 
from in any way using games of chance as promotions in connection with 
the sale of goods or services. The statute had been challenged by the 
Mobil Oil Corporation, Joseph G. KuIper (a Westfield, Massachusetts 
service station owner-operator) and Glendinning Companies (a com-
pany which plans and develops sales promotions). The plaintiffs argued 
that the act was violative of both the equal protection and due process 
clauses of the Massachusetts and federal constitutions,3 and also alleged 
that the federal government had pre-empted the field of promotional 
game regulations in the retail fuel industry. The Court held, inter alia,4 
that the statute represented a reasonable classification and thus met the 
requirements of equal protection; that the statute was a valid exercise 
of the police power and did not violate due process of law; and that the 
federal government had not pre-empted the field and the statute merely 
imposed stricter supervision of the area in question. Justice Hennessey, 
joined by Chief Justice Tauro, filed a strong dissenting opinion on equal 
protection grounds. 
Although the legislative background of the statute will be explored 
further in this casenote, a brief note at this point may be useful in eluci-
dating the thrust of the regulatory enactment. The act apparently orig-
inated in response to general complaints voiced by service station pro-
prietors and members of the public and directed at varying facets of 
the promotional operation. !I Proprietors complained of coercive tactics 
§18.8. 1 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 561, 280 N.E.2d 406. 
2 Inserting §6C of G.L., c. 271: "No dealer or seHer of motor vehicle fuel shaIl 
engage in, promote or in any way operate any contest or game by which a person 
may, as determined by chance, receive gifts, prizes or gratuities in connection with 
the sale of goods or services. This section shaIl apply to any such contest or game 
whether or not a purchase is required to participate therein." The statute prescribes 
criminal sanctions by way of fine or imprisonment for violations. 
3 The pertinent equal protection provisions are the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution and Articles 6 and 7 of the Declaration of Rights 
of Massachusetts. The pertinent due process provisions are the Fourteenth Amend-
ment ,to the United States Constitution and Articles 1, 7, 10, and 12 of the De-
claration of Rights of Massachusetts. 
4 The Court also rejected the Attorney General's assertion, brought by counter-
claim, 1:h:at the continued use of game promotions violated G.L., c. 271, §7, which 
penailizes the promotion of lotteries, and that the game pieces used in connection 
with game promotions were a common nuisance under G.L., c. 271, §20, which 
makes possession of lottery tickets unlawful. 
5 There are no formal records of the legislative history of the statute, nor were 
formal legislative hearings held. The legislative background discussed in this case-
note was reconstructed conversations with the chief architect of .the legis-
lation, Harry A. S. Read, then Representative from Barnstable, as well as two 
46
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1972 [1972], Art. 21
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1972/iss1/21
§18.8 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 501 
employed by their wholesalers in forcing them to employ the games as a 
marketing device. However, the individual service station owner-operator 
had to purchase the game tickets and assume the added burden of dis-
pensing these tickets to their customers.6 Members of the public also 
protested the use of the games as a nuisance and expressed doubts as to 
the honesty involved in the distribution of prizes.7 The legislative re-
sponse to these complaints took the shape of the challenged statute. 
In their challenge to the statute, plaintiffs argued that two aspects of 
Chapter 602 violated equal protection guarantees.s The first of these 
equal protection arguments related to the overbreadth of the statutory 
restriction.9 The statutory ban on the use of promotional games was not 
limited to those operated in connection with the sale of fuel alone.1° 
Inasmuch as retail fuel dealersll generally compete with other merchants 
in the marketing of automotive and non-automotive goods and services,12 
plaintiffs argued that fuel dealers were unfairly restricted while com-
petitors outside the retail fuel industry were free to utilize this pro-
motional device, without similar restriction. The proprietor of a tire 
store, for example, may conduct promotional games to stimulate his 
business, while a fuel dealer who also markets tires on his premises is 
not afforded the opportunity to utilize such marketing aids. Thus, plain-
tiffs argued, the extent to which Chapter 602 regulated the business 
other major sponsors of the bill, John A. S. McGlennon, then Representative from 
Concord,and Martin A. Linsky, then Representative from Brookline. Mr. Read 
also made available his extensive files compiled during the bill's progress through 
the legislature. Receipt of general complaints about the ope~tion of the games 
prompted an investigation of the area. 
6 Such complaints were directed at various members of the legislature, accord-
ing to Mr. Read. 
7 Id. 
S For the purposes of this casenote, the state and federal constitutional pro-
visions will be treated as co-extensive. 
9 "An over-inclusive classification includes not only those who are similarly 
situated with respect to the purpose [of the benefit or burden imposed by the 
statute] but others who ,are not so situated as well." Note, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1065, 
1086 (1969). 
10 The pertinent part of the statute reads: " ... in connection with the sale of 
goods or services." G.L., c. 271, §6C. 
11 The interchangeable use of the terms "retail fuel dealer(s)," "gasoline 
dealer(s)," or "fuel dealer(s)" in this casenote is intended to apply to retail 
dealers in motor vehicle fuel, consistent with the terms of Chapter 602,and not 
to be confused with retail dealers in heating oil or other types of fuel. 
12 As the record indicated, merchants who operate not only car washes, auto 
body shops, automobile repair garages, and automobile stores, but also department 
stores, discount stores, hardware stores, drug stores, variety stores, supermarkets, 
superettes, and grocery stores 'sell many of the same products and services sold by 
gasoline sellers. Record at 19-20. Mobil and KuIper competed with these other 
merchants in a wide variety of products. Their sale of products ather than motor 
vehicle fuel constituted an important and substantial part of their overall business. 
Record at 19. 
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activities of service stations other than with regard to the sale of motor 
vehicle fuel made that statute suspect as an overly restrictive regulation. 
The second argument in plaintiffs' equal protection challenge to 
Chapter 602 was that the legislature had imposed an arbitrary restric-
tion on a particular class of merchants by singling out only the retail fuel 
industry for sanction in the use of promotional contests. If promotional 
games were indeed a proper object of legislative concern, then such 
action as the legislature deemed appropriate should apply to the opera-
tion of such games in all retail industries. Arguing that no rational basis 
existed for distinguishing the promotional contests in the retail fuel in-
dustry from those contests operated in other industries, plaintiffs as-
sailed the restriction effected by Chapter 602 as an underinclusive clas-
sification.13 
The Court rejected both of these contentions, holding that the statute 
did not violate the equal protection sanctions, either by overbreadth or 
underinclusiveness.14 By determining that the statute was not an ir-
rational restriction on owners of dual or multiple businesses, the Court 
first dismissed the argument that the statute was overbroad. In defend-
ing the reasonableness of the classification, the Court stated that the 
statute was ·aimed at the business of selling motor vehicle fuel, and 
"[ t] he extension to games 'in connection with' other goods and services 
when part of the business of selling motor vehicle fuel, if it is an extension, 
is reasonable in the interest of clarification and enforceability."15 
When a statute is challenged on equal protection grounds, the basic 
test by which it must be judged is that of reasonableness,16 States are 
13 "Under-inclusion occurs when a state benefits or burdens persons in a man-
ner that furthers a legitimate public purpose but does not confer this same benefit 
or place this same burden on others who are similarly situated." Note, 82 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1065, 1084 (1969). 
14 As the Court itself noted, a trial court in Maryland accepted these grounds 
for holding a similar statute unconstitutional. On appeal, the Maryland court in-
dicated that the statute could be confined by construction to promotional games 
relating .to the sale of motor vehicle fuels, refused to pass on the equal protection 
issue in the absence of an evidentiary hearing, and remanded the case for such a 
hearing. 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 561, 573, 280 N.E.2d 406, 416, citing State's At-
torney for Charles County v. Triplett, 255 Md. 270, 285-288,257 A.2d 748, 753-
756 (1969). 
15 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 561, 574, 280 N.E.2d 406, 416. 
16 In Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., the Supreme Court stated: "The 
equal protection dause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not take from the State 
the power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits of the exercise of 
a wide scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids what is done only.when it is 
without any reasonable basis and therefore is purely arbitrary. • . . A classifica-
tion having some reasonable basis does not offend against that clause merely because 
it is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some 
inequality." 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911). See also Atchinson & Santa Fe Ry. v. Vosburg, 
238 U.S. 56, 59 (1915) and Barrett v. Indiana, 229 U.S. 26, 30 (1912). On equal 
protection generally, see Note, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1065 (1969). 
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granted wide latitude in enacting laws to protect the public, and the 
law does not require that all persons or groups be treated exactly alike.17 
If the legislative difference in treatment is reasonably related to a valid 
state objective, then the classification is permissable,18 Whether a classi-
fication is deemed reasonable depends in large measure on its ability 
to treat equally those similarly situated.19 
The Court in Mobil asserted that its construction of Chapter 602 was 
not vastly different from that accorded a New Jersey statute prohibiting 
promotional games "in connection with the sale of motor fuels."20 A 
careful reading of that statute, however, reveals that its similarity to 
Chapter 602 is purely superficial. In framing the prohibition to cover 
promotional games "in connection with the sale of motor fuels," (emphasis 
added) the New Jersey Legislature thereby left the door open for retail 
fuel dealers to operate promotional games in connection with the sale of 
all other goods and services. The Massachusetts statute, by contrast, ex-
tends the prohibition to the use of such games "in connection with the 
sale of goods or services." (emphasis added.) This encompasses nonfuel 
goods and services as well, and it places the fuel retailer on an unequal 
commercial footing with his competitors. The very fact that the New 
Jersey statute is more specific than Chapter 602 distinguishes it and 
avoids the overbreadth argument raised by Chapter 602. Although the 
plaintiffs argued this distinction the Court was not persuaded. However, 
Justice Hennessey noted in his dissent that "in the sale of nonfuel 
products, gasoline sellers and others are similarly situated and form one 
class. That being so, the present statute treats members of the same 
class unequally."21 The Court confined its analysis to the question of 
the rational basis for Chapter 602, and gave no consideration to the 
end result of the statutory prohibition. Judge Hennessey's argument, 
therefore, remains unanswered. 
In its analysis of the second equal protection argument, that the class 
was underinclusive, the Court considered precedent for regulating fuel 
dealers as a distinct class and the legislative motivation for enacting 
Chapter 602. Both of these bear analysis. The line of precedent related 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 "The Constitution does not require that things different in fact be treated 
in law as though they were the same. But it does require, in its concern for equality, 
that those who are similarly situated be similarly 'treated. The measure of the 
reasonableness of a classification is the degree of its success in treating similarly 
those similarly situated." Tussman and tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the 
Laws, 37 Calif. Rev. 341,344 (1949). 
20 N.]. Rev. Stat. §56:6-2(f), whkh was upheld in United Stations of N.J. 
(US) v. Getty Oil Co., 102 N.J. Super. 459, 246 A.2d 150 (1968), aff. sub nom. 
Del Spina v. Getty Oil Co., 54 N.]. 150,253 A.2d 813 (1969). 
21 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 561, 583, 280 N.E.2d 406, 422. 
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to price sign regulation,22 and it is therefore distinguishable from the 
situation in Mobil.23 In Slome v.· Chief of Police of Fitchburg,24 the 
Court considered the validity of a statute which specified the size and 
location of signs which advertised the price of gasoline. The Court up-
held the statute, but stressed that its decision in no way should be con-
strued to interfere with the freedom of proprietors of filling stations to 
display any signs with prices of any products other than gasoline.25 
Because "[ a] 11 persons engaged in the retail sale of motor fuel are af-
fected alike in the uniform enforcement of the statute,"26 there was no 
denial of equal protection. In Mobil gasoline sellers compete with other 
retail merchants but they are not affected alike in the enforcement of 
Chapter 602. The application of the statute in Slome was confined to 
a particular aspect of the marketing practices of retail fuel dealers, and 
it did not restrict the marketing freedom of the fuel dealers with respect 
to nonfuel products. 
In discussing the possible legislative motivation, the Court noted the 
particular nature of filling stations, their easy accessibility and their 
vulnerability to destructive price wars and to unfair practices resulting 
from competitive pressures. The Court determined that the legislature 
could reasonably have believed that whatever problems promotional 
games present are more acute in the retail fuel industry than in other 
retail industries. This consideration alone would justify the legislative 
decision to prohibit promotional games in this particular industry, since 
the legislature may proceed one step at a time, addressing itself to that 
phase of a problem which seems most acute, and need not embrace 
every conceivable problem within that field.27 Since there was no in-
vidious discrimination involved in the legislative classification and since 
a rational basis did in fact exist for affording the retail fuel industry 
22 Commonwealth v. Slome, 321 Mass. 713, 75 N.E.2d 517 (1947); Merit 
Oil Co. v. Director of the Div. on the Necessaries of Life, 319 Mass. 301, 65 
N.E.2d 529 (1946); Slome v. Chief of Police of Fitchburg, 304 Mass. 187, 23 
N.E.2d 133 (1939). 
23 The Court's decisions in the price sign Cases are also against the weight of 
authority in other jurisdictions. At least seven other states have passed legislation 
similar to the Massachusetts fuel price sign regulation statute, G.L., c. 94, §295C. 
Courts in six of those seven have struck down all or parts of those statutes. Con-
necticut (State v. Miller, 126 Conn. 373, 12 A.2d 192 (1940)); Delaware (State 
v. Hobson, 46 Del. 381,83 A.2d 846 (1951)); Maine (State v. Union Oil Co. 
of Maine, 151 Me. 438, 120 A.2d 708 (1956)); Michigan (Levy v. City of 
Pontiac, 331 Mich. 100, 49 N.W.2d 80 (1951)); New Jersey (Regal Oil Co. v. 
State, 123 N.J.L. 456, 10 A.2d 495 (1939)); Pennsylvania (Gambone v. Com-
monwealth, 375 Pa. 547, 101 A.2d 634 (1954)). Only New York has upheld 
such legislation. (People v. Arlen Servo Stations, Inc., 284 N.Y. 34-0, 31 N.E.2d 
184 (1940)). 
24 304 Mass. 187, 23 N.E.2d 133 (1939). 
25 Id. at 189, 23 N.E.2d at 135. 
26 Id. at 192, 23 N.E.2d at 137. 
27 McDonald v. Board of Election, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969). 
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special treatment, the Court concluded that the statute did not offend 
the equal protection doctrine on grounds of underinclusiveness. 
While legislative enactments are generally accorded a strong presump-
tion of validity,28 that presumption may be rebutted by a strong showing 
of proo£.29 In Pinnick v. Cleary,30 in which the Court upheld the no-fault 
insurance law, Chief Justice Tauro suggested the virtual impossibility 
of showing the unconstitutionality of a statute unless a complete factual 
foundation appears in the record.31 In Mobil plaintiffs offered extensive 
evidence to prove that promotional games were the same, whether used 
by fuel retailers or by merchants competing directly with such dealers 
with respect to products other than motor vehicle fuel, or by still other 
businessmen seIling a broader variety of products.32 Curiously, the Court 
conceded: 
The record does not establish that the promotional games of gaso-
line dealers have distinctive misleading characteristics, that they ad-
versely affect the retail price of gasoline, or that they involve the 
coercion of gasoline dealers by landlord-suppliers.33 
This statement undermines the Court's later position that such dis-
tinctive characteristics might have moved the legislature to adopt the 
statute: 
The Legislature could reasonably have thought, in 1968, that some 
or all of these features of the typical gasoline station made the prob-
lem of promotional games more pressing with respect to them than 
with respect to other retail merchants.34 
The statutory classification implies a general disapproval of the use of 
games in this particular industry. Justice Hennessey included in his • 
dissent a detailed examination of the statute's classification scheme, and 
concluded that it 
... is not one based on the type of product since it applies to all 
products sold by motor vehicle fuel sellers. The distinction seems 
to be solely one of person: he who sells motor vehicle fuel as a large 
or small part of his business activity has become so specially affected 
that his promotion of nonfuel products on the same premises is pro-
hibited, whereas those in competition with him in the sale of non-
fuel products who sell no motor vehicle fuel are exempted from the 
prohibition.35 
28 Commonwealth v. Finnigan, 326 Mass. 378, 379,96 N.E.2d 715, 716 (1950). 
29 See Pinnick v. Cleary, 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1129, 1159, 271 N.E.2d 592, 
612. Pinnick is discussed in 18 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §16.3. (1971). 
30 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1129, 271 N.E.2d 592. 
31 Id. at 1159, 271 N.E.2d at 612 (concurring opinion). 
32 Record at 21-22. 
33 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh, 561, 574, 280 N.E.2d 406, 416. 
34 Id. at 575, 280 N.E.2d at 417. 
35 Id. at 581, 280 N.E.2d at 420. 
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If, indeed, the legislature was motivated by a general disapproval of 
the games in the retail fuel industry, the restriction it fashioned in Chap-
ter 602 would not be consonant with equal protection principles estab-
lished in two earlier cases. In Hall-Omar Baking Co. v. Commissioner of 
Labor & Indust.ries,36 the Court struck down a statute which required 
the driver-salesmen of all businesses to obtain peddler's licenses, with an 
exemption for the driver-salesmen of dairy products. Plaintiff, a bakery 
goods seller, argued that the classification was arbitrary. The Court 
agreed, holding that the statute was an "unequal application . . . which 
makes an arbitrary distinction between businesses which, so far as their 
attributes relevant to such classification are concerned, are alike."37 
Similarly, in Vigeant v. Postal Telegraph Cable Co.J38 the Court invali-
dated a statutory provision imposing strict tort liability upon telegraph 
companies for any injuries caused by their poles, wires, and other equip-
ment. The Court found no rational relation between the legislative pur-
poses and the restricted class selected by the legislature and no reason to 
exempt telephone, electric, and other companies utilizing equipment 
similar to that of the telegraph companies.39 
In M obilJ the Court acceded to the classification on the premise that 
a legislative act need not embrace every conceivable problem within the 
regulated area as long as the area is a proper one for regulation: the regu-
latory scheme may thus be implemented one step at a time. The weakness 
in this approach was noted by Justice Hennessey: "To say that such 
unequal treatment is permissible because it is an initial step or one in-
tended to be only partially remedial would do an injustice to the con-
stitutional principle involved."4O In any case, there was no evidence that 
the legislature contemplated further action to regulate promotional 
games in other industries.41 If the prohibition effected by Chapter 602 
seems both absolute in its intended coverage and isolated from any com-
prehensive legislative scheme, the one-step-at-a-time rationale should 
therefore not apply. 
The second constitutional challenge to Chapter 602 was that the 
statute arbitrarily interfered with the right of service station operators 
to conduct and promote their business, thus depriving them of their 
property without due process of law. Plaintiffs argued that the games 
were a valuable merchandising tool and the statutory prohibition was 
unnecessarily restrictive since regulation of specific abuses was avail-
able as an alternative. However, the Court determined that the statute 
was a valid exercise of the police power which did not infringe the due 
process guarantee. 
36 344 Mass. 695, 184 N.E.2d 344 (1962). Hall-Omu is discussed in 9 Ann. 
Surv. Mass. Law §l0.5 (1962). 
37 Id. at 707, 184 N.E.2d at 352. 
38 260 Mass. 335, 157 N.E. 651 (1927). 
39 Id. at 341, 157 N.E. at 654. 
40 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 561, 584, 280 N.E.2d 406, 422. 
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The test of a statute under due process is whether it "bears a real 
and substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or some 
other phase of the general welfare."42 The statute in M obit was designed 
to protect service station proprietors and consumers from abuses grow-
ing out of the operation of the games. In the Court's analysis, that de-
sign reflected a legislative determination that such games should play 
no part in the retail fuel sales process. Such a determination was not 
without reason, since "considerations of price, quality, versatility, and 
so forth are some of the many valid criteria to be employed in making 
intelligent consumer purchases, and the use of such criteria is to be 
encouraged."43 Thus, "the Legislature might rationally seek to dis-
courage the real, though sometimes unconscious, attraction to one of 
several competing products, solely because a prize may be won, as not in 
the public interest."* 
When the due process test is applied to a statute, "[ e] nforcement is 
qualified or restricted under the police power, the broad power, 
A corollary principle is that one cannot operate his business with com-
plete freedom but is subject to reasonable regulations established to 
govern the operation and conduct of business.46 
[T]hat right [to conduct one's business], like many others, may be 
qualified or restricted under the police power,-the broad power, 
never precisely delimited, to take rational action for the protection 
of the public safety, health, morals, comfort, and good order.47 
The extent to which the state can arbitrarily interfere with the right to 
conduct and promote one's business has been the subject of much litiga-
tion in Massachusetts. While a state has broad latitude under the police 
power to regulate business activity, it is not without some limitation. In 
Sperry and Hutchinson Co. v. Director of the Div. on the Necessaries of 
Life,48 the Court struck down a provision which forbade gasoline sellers 
to use trading stamps in connection with their business, stating: "A State 
cannot, 'under guise of protecting the public, arbitrarily interfere with 
42 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 561, 572. 280 N.E.2d 406, 415, citing Coffee-Rich, 
Inc. v. Commissioner of Public Health, 348 Mass. 414, 422, 204 N.E.2d 281, 287 
(1965), quoting Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Director of the Div. on the Neces-
saries of Life, 307 Mass. 408, 418, 30 N.E.2d 269,275 (1940). 
43 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 561, 572, 280 N.E.2d 406, 415. 
44 Id. at 572-573, 280 N.E.2d at 415-416. 
45 Coffee-Rich, Inc. v. Commissioner of Public Health, 348 Mass. 414, 422, 
204 N.E.2d 281, 287 (1965). Commonwealth v. Finnigan, 326 Mass. 378, 379, 96 
N.E.2d 715, 716 (1950). 
46 Slome v. Chief of Police of Fitchburg, 304 Mass. 187, 190, 23 N.E.2d 133, 
136 (1939). Commonwealth v. Libbey, 216 Mass. 356, 358, 103 N.E. 923, 924 
(1914). 
47 McMurdo v. Getter, 298 Mass. 363,366, 10 N.E.2d 139, 141 (1937). 
48 307 Mass. 408, 30 N.E.2d 269 (1940). 
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private business or prohibit lawful occupations or impose unreasonable 
and unnecessary restrictions upon them.' "49 Unless such regulations are 
reasonably related to a valid state objective, they cannot be upheld. 
Similar standards have been applied in other states. In People v. Vic-
tor,50 the Michigan Supreme Court struck down a statute prohibiting 
the giving away of any premium or prize. In People v. Gillson}1 the 
New York Court of Appeals invalidated a statute which made it a mis-
demeanor for any person selling food to simultaneously give to the 
purchaser any gift, prize, premium or reward. The only distinction be-
tween promotional games and trading stamps and other prizes is the 
"gaming" or "chance" element. The Mobil Court rejected the Attorney 
General's contention that the promotional games constituted a lottery in 
violation of the law.52 Therefore, the distinction accorded the "gaming" 
or "chance" giveaway would seem to rest on an arbitrary moral founda-
tion rather than a legal premise, and it is arguably on that basis alone 
that the promotional games in the retail industry have been banned while 
the other giveaways have not been disturbed. 
In Sperry and Slome, the Court considered the constitutionality of 
different parts of the same statute.53 The section of the statute which 
merely regulated the size and location of price signs was upheld in Slome; 
the section whose effect was to prohibit use of trading stamps by retail 
fuel dealers was struck down in SPerry. The plaintiffs in Mobil argued 
that, while regulation was upheld as consonant with equal protection 
guidelines in the Slome case, the Sperry decision would impose a rigid 
test on any outright prohibition. 54 Read together, Sperry and Slome 
arguably suggest that the Court would generally be more inclined to 
entertain the less restrictive alternative of regulation as opposed to com-
plete prohibition of a marketing device. Even if the legislature did not 
exceed its authority under the police power in framing Chapter 602, it 
would have been on safer constitutional ground had it chosen to regu-
late the games instead of levying an absolute prohibition. In Coffee-Rich, 
Inc. v. Commissioner of Pub. Health,55 the Court invalidated a statute 
proscribing the sale of a cream substitute under the due process clause of 
the Massachusetts Constitution, stating: 
[A] less arbitrary approach to protect consumers from fraud and 
confusion, and a particularly obvious one, would be to penalize 
those who actually practice the deception rather than the guiltless 
49 Id. at 418-419, 30 N.E.2d at 275, quoting Commonwealth v. S. S. Kresge 
Co., 267 Mass. 145, 151, 166 N.E. 558, 560 (1929). 
50 287 Mioh. 506, 283 N.W. 666 (1939). 
51 109 N.Y. 389,17 N.E. 343 (1888). 
52 See note 4, supra. 
53 Slome was concerned with G.L., c. 94, §295C Sperry with G.L., c. 94, 
§295E. 
54 Brief for Plaintiffs at 54. 
55 348 Mass. 414, 204 N.E.2d 281 (1965). 
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producer or distributor of Coffee-Rich and, indirectly, those con-
sumers who want to purchase the product precisely because it is a 
nondairy product.56 
While there may indeed be instances where regulation might prove fruit-
less and prohibition would be a necessary remedy, no evidence was in-
troduced in Mobil to suggest that such was the case, and the complete 
prohibition can be criticized as unduly severe. 
The third constitutional issue in Mobil was whether the regulation of 
promotional games in the retail fuel industry was pre-empted by the 
federal government by virtue of alleged conflicts either with FTC rules57 
or with some exclusive federal interest under the supremacy clause. Pre-
emption occurs only when the local law "stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress,"58 or when the federal law manifests a clear intent to pre-empt 
the field.59 The Court concluded that the federal rule enacted here was 
intended to establish minimum standards of regulation. Chapter 602 did 
not prohibit the intrastate or interstate advertising and sale of motor 
vehicle fuel, but only a particular type of promotional activity within 
the state. The interstate commerce clause "did not withdraw from the 
states the power to legislate with respect to their local concerns, even 
though such legislation may indirectly and incidentally affect interstate 
commerce and persons engaged in it."60 For that reason, the third argu-
ment was also dismissed. 
Legislative intent was an essential factor in the equal protection and 
due process analyses. However, the Court's opinion largely ignores the 
legislative history of Chapter 602. General complaints about the opera-
tion of promotional games in the retail fuel industry prompted a group 
of state legislators to initiate corrective legislation in 1968.61 A similar 
concern was evident at the same time in several other states and at the 
federal level. Maryland, which provided the model for the Massachu-
setts statute,62 had prohibited the games earlier in 1968. New Jersey 
56 Id. at 424-425, 204 N.E.2d at 288. 
57 16 C.F.R. §419.1 (1971). 
58 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 561, 568, 280 N.E.2d 406, 413, quoting Hines v. 
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). See a:lso Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 
649-650 (1971) and Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 502 (1956). 
59 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 561, 569, 280 N.E.2d 406, 413, citing Napier v. At-
lantic Coast Line, 272 U.S. 605, 611 (1926); Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 
497, 501-506 (1956); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 231-236 
(1947); Commonwealth v. Haseotes, 356 Mass. 230, 236, 249 N.E.2d 639, 643 
(1969). 
60 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 561, 570-571, 280 N.E.2d 406, 414, citing Common-
wealth v. New York Central Railroad, 350 Ma:ss. 724, 728, 216 N.E.2d 870, 872 
(1966), quoting Boston & Maine R. Co. v. Armburg, 285 U.S. 234, 238 (1932). 
See also Commonwealth v. Haseotes, 356 Mass. 230, 234, 249 N.E.2d 639, 642 
(1969). 
61 See note 5, supra. 
62 The Maryland statute has since been amended to include a prohibition on 
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promulgated a similar law.53 Early in 1968, a trade newspaper noted 
dealer discontent in Ohio and Virginia.1i4 Michigan, Kentucky, and 
Wisconsin had prohibited the games under general lottery statutes.65 
At the federal level, a congressional subcommittee began investigating 
the games in mid-March of the same year and opened hearings in June.66 
The Federal Trade Commission had a staff report under preparation at 
the same time.67 The subcommittee and the FTC both concluded that 
abuses existed in the operation of the games, although little evidence 
of overt coercion was reported.68 Regulation by the FTC followed shortly 
thereafter.69 
The Massachusetts Gasoline Dealers Association fully endorsed the 
Massachusetts bill/o claiming that 90% of the retailers in the state sup-
ported the proposal.71 While there is no evidence of any effort on the 
part of retailers to oppose the measure, several of the major oil com-
panies conducted extensive lobbying efforts in an attempt to defeat the 
bilL72 The inference to be drawn from this history is that the wholesalers, 
and not the retailers, were the ones who wanted to preserve the con-
tests. While the crux of the plaintiffs' equal protection and due process 
arguments is that the individual retailer is hurt by his inability to con-
duct promotional games, the retailers, as a group, did not want the 
games. Thus, the argument for keeping the games, although cast on 
behalf of the retailer, would seem to serve the interest of the wholesalers 
instead. 
The record in the Mobil case did not indicate extensive abuses in the 
operation of the games. However, it is apparent from the federal investi-
gation of this area that irregularities were prevalent, and this conclu-
the use of promotional games in all retail industries in connection with the sale 
of all retail goods. Mo. Ann. Code Art. 37, §369A. 
63 N.]. Rev. Stat. §56: 6-2 (f). 
64 The Gas Retailer, Jan. 3, 1968. 
65 Mich. Stat. Ann. §28.604; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §436, 360; Wis. Stat. Ann. 
§94S.01-02. 
66 House Subcommittee on Regulatory and Enforcement Agencies, chaired by 
Rep. Dingell of Michigan, of the House Select Committee on Small Business. 
Activity of the Committee reported in U.S. Oil Week, June 24, 1968. 
67 Staff Report to the Federal Trade Commission: Economic Report on the 
Use of Games of Chance in Food and Gasoline Retailing (December 1968). This 
report examined the retail food industry as well as the retail fuel industry, devoting 
a considerably greater proportion of its research efforts to an investigation of food 
retailing. This would seem to bear out a greater consumer· interest in retail food 
marketing and arguably challenges the wisdom of tlhe Massachusetts legislature's 
decision to single out the fuel industry. 
68 See U.S. Oil Week, June 24, 1968, and FTC staff report, note 46, supra, 
in passim. 
69 See note 64, supra. 
70 Letter from Frederick H. Moore, Executive Secretary of the Mass. Gasoline 
Dealers Assoc., to Harry Read, July 1, 1968. 
71 Boston Globe, June 30, 1968, 36, col. 4. 
72 Lowell Sun, July 16, 1968, , col. 
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sion is supported by the position of the Massachusetts Gasoline Retailers 
Association. Even in the absence of overt coercion, fuel retailers were 
subject to pressures to stay abreast of their competitors by using the games. 
Thus, legislative intervention in this area was probably justified and timely. 
But regardless of the merit of Chapter 602, the Mobil decision must be 
criticized for its superficial treatment of the important constitutional 
arguments raised in the case. 
The Mobil court applied the presumption of statutory validity, and 
confined its inquiry to a consideration of whether any rational basis 
existed for the promulgation of the statute. In so doing, the Court an-
alyzed the purpose of Chapter 602 but seemingly ignored its effect. Even 
if the purpose of a challenged statute serves a valid state interest, it may 
nonetheless create a classification which denies equal protection. Had 
Chapter 602 limited its ban on the use of promotional games to games 
operated in connection with the sale of fuel alone, as the New Jersey 
statute had done, the problem of overbreadth would have been avoided. 
Yet, the Court failed to appreciate this distinction. Had Chapter 602 
prohibited the games in all retail industries, as the Maryland statute now 
does,13 the problem of underinclrusiveness would also be avoided. It is 
submitted that the Court's analysis of Chapter 602 was not as complete 
or as probing as it should have been and this decision should not be 
accorded great weight as precedent in future constitutional decisions. 
STEPHEN J. BUCHBINDER 
STUDENT COMMENT 
§18.9. Standing to assert third party rights: Eisenstadt v. Baird) 
William Baird, an advocate of birth control, lectured to an audience at 
Boston University on the subject of contraception. During the lecture 
he exhibited various contraceptive devices and at the conclusion of the 
lecture he was arrested after he had handed a young woman a package 
of vaginal foam. Baird was charged with two violations of G.L., c. 272, 
§§21 and 21A: giving away a certain medicine and article for the pre-
vention of conception, and unlawfully exhibiting contraceptive articles. 
Section 21 generally prohibits the distribution and exhibition of birth 
control devices, while section 21A creates exceptions allowing registered 
physicians and pharmacists to furnish contraceptives to married persons.2 
73 See note 68, supra. 
§18.9. 1 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
2 G.L., c. 272, §21 provides: Except as provided in section twenty-one A 
whoever sell's, lends, gives away, exhibits, or offers to sell, lend or give away an 
instrument or other article intended to be used for self-abuse, or any drug, 
medicine, instrument or article whatever for the prevention of conception or for 
causing unlawful abortion, or advertises the same, or writes, prints, or causes 
to be written or printed a card, circular, book, pamphlet, advertisement or notice 
of any kind stating when, where, how, of whom or by what means such article 
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After finding Baird guilty on both charges, the superior court, pursuant 
to G.L., c. 278, §30, reported the case to the Supreme Judicial Court 
for a decision as to the constitutionality of sections 21 and 21A. In 
Commonwealth v. Baird)3 the Supreme Judicial Court overturned Baird's 
conviction for exhibiting the contraceptive devices, holding that, to the 
extent that section 21 prohibited exhibition it was unconstitutional as 
applied to Baird. The Court held that the exhibition was incidental to 
and part of the lecture itself and therefore protected speech under the 
First Amendment.4 However, by a 4-3 majority, the Court sustained 
Baird's conviction for distribution of a contraceptive on the ground that 
he was not a permissible distributor under section 21A.5 Baird's argu-
ment that distribution of the contraceptive was protected speech under 
the First Amendment was rejected on the ground that the act of distribu-
tion went beyond expression to prohibited conduct. 
Section 21A embodies two distinct limitations on the distribution of 
contraceptives. The first restricts the class of permissible distributors to 
registered physicians and registered pharmacists who are actually en-
gaged in pharmacy; the second restricts lawful distributees to married 
persons. The majority concluded that the restriction on permissible 
distributors was reasonably related to the protection of public health and 
thus not in violation of due process requirements: 
The Commonwealth has a legitimate interest in preventing the dis-
tr~bution of articles designed to prevent conception which may have 
undesirable, if not dangerous, physical consequences. . . . 
Therefore, we do not declare that a statute preventing distribu-
tion by indiscriminate persons is 'beyond legislative power.6 
can be purchased or obtained, or manufactures or makes any such article shall 
be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than five years 
or in jailor the house of correction for not more than two and one half years or 
by a fine of not less than one hundred nor more than one thousand dollars. 
G.L., c. 272, §21A provides: A registered physician may administer to or 
prescribe for any married person drugs or articles intended for the prevention of 
pregnancy or conception. A registered pharmacist actually engaged in the business 
of pharmacy may furnish such drugs or articles to any married person presenting 
a prescription from a registered physician. 
A public health agency, a registered nurse, or a maternity health clinic operated 
by or in an accredited hospital may furnish information to any married person 
as to where professional advice regarding such drugs or articles may be lawfully 
obtained. 
This section shall not be construed as affecting the provisions of sections twenty 
and twenty-one relative to prohibition of advertising of drugs or articles intended 
for the prevention of pregnancy or conception; nor shall this section be con-
strued so as to permit the sale or dispensing of such drugs or articles by means 
of any vending machine or similar device. 
S 355 Mass. 746, 247 N.E.2d 574 (1969). 
4 Id. at 752, 247 N.E.2d at 578. 
5 Id. at 753, 247 N.E.2d at 578. 
6Id. 
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Since Baird was clearly not a permissible distributor within the meaning 
of the statute, the majority affirmed his conviction for unlawful dis-
tribution of a contraceptive. Justices Whittemore and Cutter, in dissent, 
argued that, notwithstanding the validity of the restriction of permissible 
distributors, the limitation on permissible distributees violated equal 
protection requirements: "If there is a need to have a physician prescribe 
(and a pharmacist dispense) contraceptives, that need is as great for 
unmarried persons as for married persons.'" The majority, however, 
concluded that Baird was not a permissible distributor and did not reach 
the equal protection issue: "The legitimacy of the [legislative] purpose 
depends upon a distinction as to the distributor and not as to the marital 
status of the recipient."8 Thus, in effect, Baird was denied standing to 
assert the equal protection rights of unmarried persons. 
Following the Supreme Judicial Court's affirmation of his conviction, 
Baird was imprisoned for a term of three months. After his petition for 
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court was denied,9 Baird pe-
titioned the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts 
for a writ of habeas corpus.10 He argued, inter alia, that the statute 
infringed on his right of free speech, and that the statute lacked a 
legitimate legislative purpose. Agreeing with the Supreme Judicial Court, 
the federal district court held that by giving the contraceptive to the 
young woman Baird had engaged in prohibited conduct and not in 
symbolic speech. The court also held that the restriction on permissible 
distributors was reasonably related to the legitimate legislative purpose 
of protecting the public health. At the conclusion of its opinion, the 
court specifically held that Baird did not have standing to assert the 
rights of unmarried persons: 
. This Court, however, need not decide whether §§ 21 and 21A as 
construed by the Supreme Judicial Court violate some constitutional 
right of registered physicians in their professional relationship with 
unmarried patients, or of unmarried persons themselves. These 
questions are not presented by the facts in this case. The petitioner 
is not a physician and has no express or implied authority to act for 
physicians. It does not appear that he himself is an unmarried per-
son or has any professional or other legally significant relationship 
to unmarried persons. Therefore he lacks standing to assert the con-
stitutional rights of either group.ll 
Baird appealed the decision of the federal district court to the Court 
of Appeals for the First Circuit. In Baird v. Eisenstadtp the First Cir-
, Id. at 758, 247 N.E.2d at 581. 
8 Id. at 753, 247 N.E.2d at 578. 
9 Baird v. Massachusetts, 396 U.S. 1029 (1970). 
10 Baird v. Eisenstadt, 310 F. Supp. 951 (D. Mass. 1970). 
11 310 F. Supp. at 957. 
12 429 F.2d 1398 (1st Cir. 1970). 
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cuit, stating that "[pJetitioner's more substantive claims need considerable 
rephrasing,"13 held that the real issue was "whether the statute 'bears a 
real and substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or some 
other phase of the general welfare.' "14 The court held that neither the 
public health argument (relied on in Commonwealth v. Baird and Baird 
v. Eisenstadt, supra) nor the morality argument (relied on in Sturgis v. 
Attorney Generall5 ) could uphold the statute. Although the question of 
standing is ordinarily disposed of prior to any decision on the merits, the 
court first determined that the statute was entirely void, and then held 
that, because the statute was entirely void, Baird had standing to chal-
lenge the entire statute: "We, however, have held the statute itself void. 
Petitioner is being jailed for a direct violation of that statute; he must 
have as much standing to protest as anyone else."16 
Eisenstadt, the Sheriff of Suffolk County, appealed the decision of the 
First Circuit to the United States Supreme Court,17 Approaching the 
standing question in a significantly different manner than did the First 
Circuit,the majority of the Court held that Baird had standing to chal-
lenge the statutory limitation on lawful distributees because he was an 
advocate of the right of unmarried persons to obtain contraceptives. 
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, agreed with the First Circuit's 
decision that the alleged dual objectives of regulating the distribution 
of potentially harmful articles and discouraging premarital sexual rela-
tions could not reasonably be regarded as the true legislative aims of 
sections 21 and 21A. The majority concluded the statute, viewed as a 
prohibition on contraception per se, violated the right of unmarried 
persons to equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.18 A concurring opinion by Justices White and Blackmun accepted 
the Supreme Judicial Court's determination that sections 21 and 21A 
served a valid public health purpose, but concluded that, since there 
was no proof either that the vaginal foam was dangerous or that the re-
13 Id. at 1400. 
14 Id. 
15 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1139, 260 N.E.2d 687. In Sturgis two licensed gyne-
cologists petitioned the Supreme Judicial Court for a declaratory judgment that 
section 21A was unconstitutional in that it prevented them from furnishing con-
traceptive assistance to their unmarried patients. Unlike Commonwealth v. Baird, 
Sturgis presented a situation which required the Court to decide the validity of 
the statutory distinction between married and unmarried persons. Although the 
Court stated that the distinction could be upheld on the basis of a public health 
argument similar to that relied on in Commonwealth v. Baird, the Court placed 
primary reliance on a morality argument. The Court upheld the restriction on 
permissible distributees as a valid exercise of the legitimate state objective of 
promoting morality by discouraging fornication. The theory of the argument ap-
pears to be that if unmarried persons are denied access to contraceptives, fear of 
pregnancy will deter them from extra-marital sexual activity. 
16 429 F.2d at 1402. 
17 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
18 Id. at 443. 
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cipient was unmarried, Baird's conviction could not stand.19 Justice 
Douglas also concurred in the result, but argued that the ground for 
the decision should be that Baird's distribution of the contraceptive was 
"a pennissible adjunct of free speech."20 Chief Justice Burger, the sole 
dissenter, reasoned that the statute was a valid exercise of the police 
power to protect public health, and that Baird's status as layman came 
directly within the proscription of the statute.21 Chief Justice Burger 
further asserted that Baird had no standing to challenge that part of 
the statute which restricted the class of lawful distributees.22 
It is readily apparent from the Baird cases that the question of what 
a particular petitioner can challenge and raise in his defense can mold 
the entire limits of his case. Frequently, the merits of a case are not 
reached at all because the petitioner simply does not have standing to 
raise certain issues.23 The fundamental requirement for standing in the 
federal courts is that there be a justiciable controversy, the "cases and 
controversies" requirement under Article III of the United States Con-
stitution.24 The Supreme Court has held that a justiciable controversy 
does not exist when the parties are not genuinely antagonistic,25 and will 
therefore not grant standing when the case has become moot because of 
intervening circumstances,26 when the case calls for an advisory opinion,27 
or when the case lacks immediacy or "ripeness."28 
The question of standing presented by the Baird cases was not whether 
19 Id. at 464-65. 
20 Id. at 460. 
21 Id. at 465-66. 
22 Id. at 466. 
23 See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923) (denial of standing to 
individual taxpayer suing to enjoin enforcement of al1egedly unconstitutional 
federal appropriation statute). 
24 See generally Fl'ast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94-101 (1968). 
25 United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302 (1943); Ashwander v. Tennessee 
Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (concurring opinion by Justice 
Brandeis). 
26 Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 429 (1952) (school prayer case 
in which petitioner's child had graduated by the time the case reached the Su-
preme Court); Local No. 8-6 Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union 
AFL-CIO v. Missouri, 361 U.S. 363 (1960) (strike ended before the case reached 
the Supreme Court). 
27 Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911). Some state constitutions, 
including the Massachusetts constitution (Mass. Const. pt. 2, c. 3, art. II), autho-
rize the states' courts to issue advisory opinions. See generally Note, 69 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1302 (1956). 
28 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961). The petitioners, a married couple, 
instituted proceedings in which they requested a judgment declaring unconstitu-
tional a Connecticut criminal statute which forbade the use of contraceptive 
devices and giving medical advice in the use of such devices. It was held that 
the case was not justiciable at the time since there was no allegation that the 
prosecutor intended to prosecute the petitioners for infractions of the statute. 
Consequently there was a lack of immediate threat since there was a long history 
of non-prosecution under the 75-year-old statute and evidence showed birth con-
trol devices were in fact freely available in Connecticut. 
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Baird had standing at all, but rather whether he had standing to assert 
the rights of third parties. Baird had standing to challenge the statutory 
limitation on the class of lawful distributors and the statutory prohibition 
of all forms of contraceptives without regard to the relative safety or 
danger of the various types of contraceptives because these aspects of 
the statute related directly to his actions. Baird, however, wished to 
challenge the validity of the entire statute. From this point of view, the 
most significant standing issue was whether Baird, a married man and 
not a physician, had standing to challenge the distinction drawn in sec-
tion 21A between married and unmarried persons by arguing that un-
married persons have as much right to and need for contraceptives as 
do married persons. 
The First Circuit's decision implies a novel analysis of the standing 
issue: the mere fact of his conviction was held to confer upon Baird the 
standing to attack the Massachusetts statute on any constitutional ground. 
Since the court regarded the statutory restrictions on distributors and 
distributees as unseverable provisions, a constitutional infirmity in either 
one would void the entire statute.29 Baird was therefore allowed to argue 
that the restriction on distributees was not related to a proper legislative 
purpose, even though he himself had been convicted as a distributor. 
He was allowed to do so not for the purpose of asserting third party 
rights, but to obtain a reversal of his own conviction on the ground that 
the statute was unconstitutional.30 The effect of this decision, if it were 
widely followed, would he to eliminate the traditional concept of stand-
ing as a threshold question in criminal cases involving statutorily de-
fined crimes. 
The United States Supreme Court did not adopt the First Circuit's 
analysis of Baird's standing, but chose to view the issue in terms of 
standing to assert third party rights. Under the self-imposed rule of 
judicial restraint the Supreme Court will not ordinarily permit a de-
fendant to assert the rights of others as a basis for a defense to an other-
wise valid prosecution.31 This rule flows from the constitutional principle 
that the Court may not hear claims in which the parties are not adverse 
and therefore in which there may be no genuine case or controversy. To 
render a decision on the merits of such a claim would, in essence, re-
quire an advisory opinion. On several occasions the Court has relaxed 
its self-imposed rule against a defendant's assertion of third party rights.32 
29 Compare discussion in Note, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 116 (1972). 
30 Professor Davis has developed a similar theory. He argues that a defendant 
cannot be convicted under an unconstitutional statute. Thus, in a proceeding 
already commenced, a defendant should be allowed to call to the court's attention 
any arguments which would tend to prevent the court from rendering an un-
constitutional opinion. 3 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW §2207 (Supp. 1965). 
31 United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960). 
32 For example, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), private 
school owners were permitted to assert the rights of potential pupils and their 
parents. See also Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953), discussed infra. 
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Professor Robert Sedler, in his thorough analysis of standing to assert 
third party rights, or jus tertii,33 designated four factors which he be-
lieves the Court takes into consideration in determining the scope of 
standing to assert jus tertii: (1) the interest of the party asserting third 
party rights; (2) the nature of the right asserted; (3) the relationship 
between the party asserting the right and the third party; and (4) the 
practicability of assertion of such rights by a third party in an independent 
action.34 The decision to grant standing in a given case depends on 
whether the cumulative significance of the various factors outweighs ad-
herence to the Court's traditional rule of self-restraint. In analyzing the 
standing issue presented in the Baird cases it will be helpful to apply these 
factors. 
The first factor, the interest of the party asserting third party rights, 
is basically a restatement of the fundamental requirement that there 
must be a justiciable controversy between the parties. This may be 
characterized as a jurisdictional prerequisite, precluding consideration 
of the remaining factors unless a sufficient interest is shown, that is, a 
case or controversy capable of adjudication. In Baird the Supreme Court 
expressly found that the defendant had a sufficient interest to satisfy the 
case or controversy requirement.35 Indeed, it should be apparent that in 
virtually every criminal prosecution, the interest factor would be satisfied. 
Perhaps the interest factor is best illustrated by comparing Griswold u. 
Connecticut36 and Tileston u. Ullman37 with Baird. The petitioners in 
Griswold, the executive director of Planned Parenthood and a physician, 
were criminal defendants and, like Baird, had a vital, ascertainable 
interest in the outcome of the case.38 This interest distinguishes both 
Baird and Griswold from Tileston, a 1943 Supreme Court case challenging 
the validity of a Connecticut statute which prohibited both dissemination 
of contraceptive information and the use of contraceptives. In Tileston 
the physician-petitioner sought a declaratory judgment to have the statute 
declared unconstitutional inasmuch as the effect of the statute was to 
prevent his patients from using contraceptives, thus possibly endangering 
their lives without due process. The physician claimed no deprivation 
of his own rights. The Court held that the physician had no standing 
33 Sedler, Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii in the Supreme Court, 71 
Yale L. J. 599 (1962), hereinafter cited as Sedler. 
34 Id. at 627. 
35 405 U.S. at 443. 
36 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
37 318 U.S. 44 (1943). 
38 The question of standing in Griswold is intriguing. The Court held that 
Griswold, the executive director of Planned Parenthood and Buxton, a physician, 
had standing to raise the constitutional rights of those with whom they had a 
"professional relationship." However, the Court emphasized the physician-patient 
rel'ationship, leaving the nature of Griswold's "professional relationship" unclari-
fied. Possibly Griswold's status as executive director of Planned Parenthood either 
created an association-member relationship or created a cognizable professional 
relationship in itself. 
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to attack the statute because his arguments rested solely on the constitu-
tional rights of his patients, who were fully capable of asserting their 
own rights. In both Baird and Griswold the criminal conviction assured 
the Court of a genuine interest in the litigation, whereas in Tileston the 
physician, by seeking a declaratory judgment, did not risk prosecution 
and thus could not show the same interest in the litigation shown in 
Baird and Griswold. 
The second factor to be considered is the nature of the right asserted. 
As Sedler observed, "it takes no great imagination to realize that certain 
constitutional guarantees inspire greater sensitivity on the part of the 
Court than do others."39 He proposes five categories of rights: (1) ex-
pression; (2) life, liberty and privacy; (3) procedural rights; (4) pro-
perty and contractual rights; and (5) equal protection. The third party 
right asserted in Baird is basically the right to equal protection for the 
unmarried when there is no rational basis for a discriminatory classi-
fication.4O 
The third factor to be considered is the relationship between the per-
son seeking to assert third party rights and the person or persons whose 
rights are asserted. Sedler enumerates five types of relationships com-
monly found in jus tertii situations: "(1) professional relationships; (2) 
race or class relationships; (3) commercial relationships; (4) the re-
lationship between a defendant and others affected by the statute or 
process under which he is made liable; and (5) the relationship between 
an association and its members."41 
The federal district court in Baird v. Eisenstadt, denied Baird standing 
to assert jus tertii because that court could find no legally significant re-
lationship between Baird and unmarried persons, either as a member of 
the class discriminated against (Baird was married) or as a professional 
(Baird was not a physician) .42 Unlike the defendants in Griswold, Baird 
did not claim a physician-patient or association-member43 relationship 
with members of the class discriminated against. Nevertheless, the Su-
preme Court, however, granted Baird standing to assert the rights of 
unmarried persons, noting that "doctor-patient and accessory-principal 
relationships are not the only circumstances in which one person has 
been found to have standing to assert the rights of another."44 The 
Court then analogized to Barrows v. Jackson,45 a case in which a seller 
39 Sedler at 627. 
40 Reading Baird in light of Griswold, it would seem that the ultimate right 
implicit in Baird's argument is the right to privacy, that is, freedom from un-
warranted governmental intrusion. A discussion of this right is, however, beyond 
the scope of this article. 
41 Sedler at 628. It should be noted that category (4) is really just a restate-
ment of the problem of jus tertii, and appears to be a catch-all category. 
42 310 F. Supp. at 957. 
43 See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) for a discussion of the asso-
ciation-member relationship in regard to the assertion of jus tertii. 
44 405 U.S. at 445. 
45 346 U.S. 249 (1953). 
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of land had violated a racially restricted covenant in a deed and was 
permitted to defend an action for damages for breach of covenant on 
the ground that the covenant violated the equal protection rights of 
Negro purchasers. No Negro was a party to the action. The Court stated 
that in Barrows the relationship between the defendant and the third 
party was not simply a fortuitous vendor-vendee relationship, but rather 
the 
... relationship between one who acted to protect the rights of a 
minority and the minority itself . . . . And so here the relationship 
between Baird and those rights he seeks to assert is not simply dis-
tributor and potential distributees, but that between an advocate 
of the rights of persons to obtain contraceptives and those desirous 
of doing so.46 (Emphasis added). 
In Baird, the Court gave Bar.rows an interpretation which appears 
to be broader than any interpretations in the past. Barrows had previously 
been read in the context of racial discrimination. The nature of the right 
asserted, the right of Negroes to equal protection of the laws, holds a 
high position in the hierarchy of constitutional values. Thus, permitting 
the defendant to assert the rights of Negroes who were denied equal 
protection by enforcement of the restrictive covenant was not an al-
together surprising step for the Court to take. Baird, however, con-
strued the significant relational interest in Barrows to be the relationship 
between an advocate of minority rights and the minority itself, not the 
contractual vendor-vendee relationship. Further, Baird extended the ad-
vocacy relationship beyond the racial discrimination situation. Finally, 
it should be noted that while the advocacy relationship in Ba'rrows was, 
perhaps, supported by the underlying vendor-vendee relationship, Baird's 
only relationship to the unmarried persons was that of advocate. 
An analysis of standing to advocate minority rights presents two 
immediate questions: first, who can be an advocate, and second, what 
constitutes a minority. Prior to his arrest Baird had achieved national 
prominence as an advocate of birth control. He was, in this sense, an 
established and recognized advocate of the rights of unmarried persons 
to obtain contraceptives. In contrast, the defendant in Barrows apparently 
had never been an advocate of the rights of Negroes prior to the breach 
of the restrictive covenant. Neither Baird nor Barrows establishes any 
guidelines for determining who can be an advocate in future litigation. 
Determining the existence of a minority presents similar problems. The 
minority in Baird consisted of unmarried persons who were denied con-
traceptives under the statute. In Barrows the minority consisted of possible 
Negro purchasers. A principal question unanswered by Baird and Bar-
rows is numerically how small the minority can be. 
46 405 U.S. at 445. 
47 Id. 
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The importance of the two questions raised above was diminished by 
the Court's conclusion that the impact of the litigation on third party 
interests was even more important than the relational interest between 
the party asserting jus tertii and the third party. This impact is, in 
essence, Sedler's fourth factor, the practicability of assertion of rights 
by the third party. Regarding this fourth factor Sedler stated: 
Very often where assertion by the injured party is impractical or 
unlikely, a party adversely affected may assert the former's rights. 
Although an analysis of the cases reveals that this factor is not 
conclusive, it is probably the most significant of the four factors.48 
Although the questions of who is a proper advocate and what is a 
minority will arise, they will only arise if the third party cannot practi-
cally assert his own rights. 
The Court stated that the case for permitting Baird to assert jus tertii 
was more persuasive than that for allowing the defendants in Griswold 
to assert jus tertii. In Griswold the Connecticut statute prohibited the use 
of contraceptives as well as the dissemination of contraceptive informa-
tion. There was nothing to prevent persons who wished to use contra-
ceptives from challenging the law themselves by violating the statute. In 
contrast, the Massachusetts statute prohibited distribution rather than 
use: "unmarried persons denied access to contraceptives in Massachusetts, 
unlike users of contraceptives in Connecticut, are not themselves subject 
to prosecution and, to that extent, are denied a forum in which to assert 
their own rights."49 The fact that the unmarried persons had no effective 
way to assert their own rights was probably the single most determinative 
factor in allowing Baird standing to assert jus tertii. 
The Court in Baird extended the kinds of relational interests that are 
legally cognizable in the assertion of third party rights by interpreting 
the relationship in Barrows to be that between an advocate of minority 
rights and the minority. Bavrd emphasized, however, that this expansion 
of legally cognizable relationships will probably be limited to situations 
in which the assertion of rights by the third party itself is difficult or 
impossible. Therefore Baird should not be read as a dramatic expansion 
of standing to assert third party rights. 
MARILYN B. CANE 
48 Sedler at 628. It is important to note, however, that if the first factor is 
indeed a jurisdictional prerequisite, as suggested supra, the first factor would seem 
to be paramount. Of the remaining three factors perhaps Sedler's observation is 
justified. 
49 405 U.S. at 446. 
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